An Analysis of Farmers' Insurance Choices and Federal Crop Insurance Subsidies
AbstractThe U.S. crop insurance has two distinct features that set itself apart from insurance in other areas: (i) it is explicitly subsidized with an average premium subsidy rate of about 60 percent in recent years; and (ii) the law requires the premium rate be set at actuarially fair level with the federal government paying the administrative and operational costs related to the sale and service of insurance policies. Bearing in mind these features, we examine to what extent farmers’ crop insurance choices conform to economic theory and estimate the implications of changes in premium subsidy structure. A standard expected utility maximization framework is set up to analyze the trade-offs between higher risk protection and larger subsidy payment. We show that, given actuarially fair premium, a rational farmer will choose the coverage level with the highest premium subsidy or a higher coverage level. With a large insurance unit level data, we fail to find empirical support for this theoretical results, which suggest a possible “anomaly” in insurance decisions. Estimation through mixed logit models reveals that out-of-pocket premium has a negative impact on the probability of an insurance product being chosen.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Agricultural and Applied Economics Association in its series 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. with number 151284.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
actuarial fairness; agricultural policy; coverage level; federal crop insurance; premium subsidy; Crop Production/Industries; Farm Management; Q15; Q18; Q24;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
- Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
- Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2013-07-05 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2013-07-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-IAS-2013-07-05 (Insurance Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Joseph W. Glauber, 2013. "The Growth Of The Federal Crop Insurance Program, 1990--2011," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 95(2), pages 482-488.
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