Balancing Grower Protection Against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages
AbstractUsing a dynamic principal-agent model, we analyze termination damages that protect growers from contract termination or non-renewal. We show that government imposed breach damages can be distortionary and may not necessarily lead to increased grower welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO with number 20392.
Date of creation: 2004
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Other versions of this item:
- Lee, Myoungki & Wu, Steven Y. & Fan, Maoyong, 2008. "Balancing Grower Protection Against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 33(2), August.
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