Balancing Grower Protection Against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages

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Balancing Grower Protection Against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages

Author Info

Fan, Maoyong
Lee, Myoungki
Wu, Steven

Abstract

Using a dynamic principal-agent model, we analyze termination damages that protect growers from contract termination or non-renewal. We show that government imposed breach damages can be distortionary and may not necessarily lead to increased grower welfare.

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Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO with number 20392.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea04:20392

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

James Andreoni & William T. harbaugh & Lise Vesterlund, 2002. "The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2002-01, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 20 Aug 2002. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- James Andreoni & William Harbaugh & Lise Vesterlund, 2003. "The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 893-902, June. [Downloadable!]
Tsoulouhas, Theofanis & Vukina, Tomislav, 2001. " Regulating Broiler Contracts: Tournaments versus Fixed Performance Standards," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 83(4), pages 1062-73, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Tsoulouhas, Theofanis & Vukina, Tomislav, 2000. "Regulating Broiler Contracts: Tournaments Versus Fixed Performance Standards," 2000 Annual meeting, July 30-August 2, Tampa, FL 21833, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]

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