An equilibrium solution is developed for a common-agency game that is used to study the structure of regulatory bureaucracy. Contrary to existing results, this equilibrium maintains powerful incentives for the agent. An experiment is conducted to test the competing hypotheses. The implications of common-agency on reciprocity are also examined.
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Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA with number
19876.
Length: Date of creation: 2002 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea02:19876
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