Menus of Linear Contracts in Procurement with Type-Dependent Reservation Utility
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2010-10-16 (Contract Theory and Applications)
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