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Voting Power in the Australian Senate: 1901-2004

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  • Alex Robson

Abstract

Indices of voting power are intended to measure the a priori degree of in.uence that a voter or party can expect to have in framing legislation or passing motions. Commonly used measures include those proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1954), Banzhaf (1965) and Deegan and Packel (1978). This paper computes these power indices for the Australian Senate for the period 1901-2004. The introduction of the Single Transferable Vote in the Senate in 1949 appears to have had a profound effect on the voting power of both major parties, as well as on the degree of concentration of voting power.

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Robson, 2007. "Voting Power in the Australian Senate: 1901-2004," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2007-480, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2007-480
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    File URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp480.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Mark Allen Satterthwaite, 1974. "Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and CorrespondenceTheorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions," Discussion Papers 122, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Gul, Faruk, 1989. "Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 81-95, January.
    5. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    6. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753.
    7. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Colignatus, Thomas, 2017. "One woman, one vote. Though not in the USA, UK and France," MPRA Paper 82513, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Nov 2017.

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