Voting Power in the Australian Senate: 1901-2004
AbstractIndices of voting power are intended to measure the a priori degree of in.uence that a voter or party can expect to have in framing legislation or passing motions. Commonly used measures include those proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1954), Banzhaf (1965) and Deegan and Packel (1978). This paper computes these power indices for the Australian Senate for the period 1901-2004. The introduction of the Single Transferable Vote in the Senate in 1949 appears to have had a profound effect on the voting power of both major parties, as well as on the degree of concentration of voting power.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics in its series ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics with number 2007-480.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-08-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2007-08-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2007-08-14 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gul, Faruk, 1989. "Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 81-95, January.
- Encaoua, David & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1980. "Degree of Monopoly, Indices of Concentration and Threat of Entry," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 87-105, February.
- Mark Allen Satterthwaite, 1974. "Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and CorrespondenceTheorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions," Discussion Papers 122, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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