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Policy Coordination and Dynamic Games

In: International Economic Policy Coordination

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  • Marcus Miller
  • Mark Salmon

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Marcus Miller & Mark Salmon, 1985. "Policy Coordination and Dynamic Games," NBER Chapters, in: International Economic Policy Coordination, pages 184-227, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:4135
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Miller, Marcus & Salmon, Mark, 1985. "Dynamic Games and the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in Open Economies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 124-137, Supplemen.
    2. William Poole, 1969. "Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a simple stochastic macro model," Special Studies Papers 2, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Turnovsky, Stephen J. & Brock, William A., 1980. "Time consistency and optimal government policies in perfect foresight equilibrium," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 183-212, April.
    4. William Poole, 1970. "Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Stochastic Macro Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(2), pages 197-216.
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