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Monitoring and Enforcement of Climate Policy

In: The Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy

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  • Hilary Sigman

Abstract

This paper applies recent research on environmental enforcement to a potential U.S. program to control greenhouse gases, especially through emission trading. Climate policies present the novel problem of integrating emissions reductions that are relatively easy to monitor (such as carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels) with those that may be very difficult to monitor (such as some emissions of other greenhouse gases). The paper documents the heterogeneity in monitoring costs across different parts of current carbon markets. It argues that a broad emission trading system that includes more difficult-to-enforce components can provide less incentive to violate the law than a narrower program; thus, the government may not find it more costly to assure compliance with a broader program.

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This chapter was published in:

  • Don Fullerton & Catherine Wolfram, 2012. "The Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number full10-1.
    This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number 12140.

    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:12140

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
    2. Ellerman,A. Denny & Joskow,Paul L. & Schmalensee,Richard & Montero,Juan-Pablo & Bailey,Elizabeth M., 2005. "Markets for Clean Air," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521023894, October.
      • Ellerman,A. Denny & Joskow,Paul L. & Schmalensee,Richard & Montero,Juan-Pablo & Bailey,Elizabeth M., 2000. "Markets for Clean Air," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521660839, October.
    3. Severin Borenstein, 2011. "Markets for Anthropogenic Carbon within the Larger Carbon Cycle," NBER Chapters, in: The Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy, pages 93-102 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. James B. Bushnell, 2010. "The Economics of Carbon Offsets," NBER Working Papers 16305, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996. "Tax Compliance," Working papers 9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    6. Ellerman,A. Denny & Convery,Frank J. & de Perthuis,Christian With contributions by-Name:Alberola,Emilie With contributions by-Name:Buchner,Barbara K. With contributions by-Name:Delbosc,Anaïs, 2010. "Pricing Carbon," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521196475, October.
    7. Sandeep Kapur, 2009. "An Economic Model of Whistle-Blower Policy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 157-182, May.
    8. Montero, Juan-Pablo, 2002. "Prices versus quantities with incomplete enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 435-454, September.
    9. Harford, Jon D., 1978. "Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 26-43, March.
    10. Bruce Mizrach, 2009. "Integration of the Global Emissions Trading Markets," Departmental Working Papers 200901, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    11. Marc N. Conte & Matthew J. Kotchen, 2009. "Explaining the Price of Voluntary Carbon Offsets," NBER Working Papers 15294, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Stranlund, John K. & Dhanda, Kanwalroop Kathy, 1999. "Endogenous Monitoring and Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, November.
    13. Pizer, William & Kruger, Joseph, 2004. "The EU Emissions Trading Directive: Opportunities and Potential Pitfalls," Discussion Papers dp-04-24, Resources For the Future.
    14. De Perthuis, Christian & Convery, Frank J. & Ellerman, Denny, 2010. "Pricing carbon : the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/10174, Paris Dauphine University.
    15. A. Denny Ellerman & Nick Johnstone & Friedrich Schneider & Alexander F. Wagner & Juan-Pablo Montero & Johann Wackerbauer, 2003. "Tradable Permits," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 4(1), pages 3-32, October.
    16. Malik, Arun S., 1990. "Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 97-106, March.
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    Cited by:
    1. Edilio Valentini & Edilio Valentini, 2008. "Enforcement and Environmental Quality in a Decentralized Emission Trading System," Working Papers 2008.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Hilary Sigman & Howard F. Chang, 2011. "The Effect of Allowing Pollution Offsets with Imperfect Enforcement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 268-72, May.

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