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Explicit Social Costs Of Crime In A Time Of Crisis - Costs Of Law Enforcement In The Drivers’ Crimes

In: Managing Structural Changes - Trends and Requirements

Author

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  • Tânia Dias

    (Faculty of Law, University of Porto)

  • Pedro Sousa

    (Faculty of Law and School of Criminology, University of Porto)

Abstract

By defining some behaviors as crimes, law defines incentives and protects society from direct and indirect, tangible and intangible negative impacts. Whatever the severity of the prescribed penalties for those that prevaricate, society and its institutions need to act at the level of law enforcement; otherwise, rules may not be viewed as credible. Therefore, besides all expenses incurred by actual and potential victims and those incurred by offenders, when computing the costs of crime, one must also take into account the enforcement costs. Focusing on two types of drivers’ crimes – driving under the influence of alcohol and driving without legal license – controlled in Oporto city, in this chapter we aim to present estimates about its enforcement law costs for the period 2007-2010, and, at the same time, to design a methodological guide to accomplish this target in similar legal contexts. In the end, we conclude that the enforcement law costs in Oporto and in that period almost reached the barrier of an average of 1,000,000 Euros per year, value that meant the sacrifice correspondent to the contribution of 61 productive Oporto citizens for the Portuguese Gross Domestic Product. The knowledge of this information by society and by their elected representatives is especially important when making public cost-benefits analysis in times of economic crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Tânia Dias & Pedro Sousa, 2012. "Explicit Social Costs Of Crime In A Time Of Crisis - Costs Of Law Enforcement In The Drivers’ Crimes," Book Chapters, in: João Sousa Andrade & Marta C. N. Simões & Ivan Stosic & Dejan Eric & Hasan Hanic (ed.), Managing Structural Changes - Trends and Requirements, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 111-128, Institute of Economic Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:ibg:chaptr:msc-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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