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Kyle Woodward

Personal Details

First Name:Kyle
Middle Name:
Last Name:Woodward
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pwo255
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://kylewoodward.com

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of North Carolina-Chapel-Hill

Chapel Hill, North Carolina (United States)
http://www.unc.edu/depts/econ/
RePEc:edi:deuncus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Kasberger, Bernhard & Woodward, Kyle, 2021. "Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions under Limited Information," MPRA Paper 111185, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Pycia, Marek & Woodward, Kyle, 2021. "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid," CEPR Discussion Papers 15656, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

Articles

  1. Burkett, Justin & Woodward, Kyle, 2020. "Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
  2. Burkett, Justin & Woodward, Kyle, 2020. "Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 297-306.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Pycia, Marek & Woodward, Kyle, 2021. "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid," CEPR Discussion Papers 15656, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Bernhard Kasberger & Kyle Woodward, 2021. "Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions under Limited Information," Papers 2112.11320, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    2. Pär Holmberg & Thomas Tangerås, 2021. "Strategic Reserves versus Market-wide Capacity Mechanisms," Working Papers EPRG2109, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    3. Takahiro Hattori & Shogo Takahashi, 2021. "Discriminatory versus uniform auctions:Evidence from JGB market," Discussion papers ron344, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan.

Articles

  1. Burkett, Justin & Woodward, Kyle, 2020. "Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).

    Cited by:

    1. Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021. "A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    2. Labrini Zarpala, 2023. "Auctioning Corporate Bonds: A Uniform-Price under Investment Mandates," Papers 2306.07134, arXiv.org.
    3. Burkett, Justin & Woodward, Kyle, 2020. "Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 297-306.
    4. Cumpston, Anne & Khezr, Peyman, 2020. "Multi-Unit Auctions: A Survey of Theoretical Literature," MPRA Paper 101336, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Peyman Khezr & Anne Cumpston, 2022. "A review of multiunit auctions with homogeneous goods," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 1225-1247, September.
    6. Shiying Chen & Zhenhuan Dong & Chunming Cao & Changjun Zheng, 2022. "Strategy and design of multi‐unit auction in grouped asymmetric setting," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3435-3453, December.
    7. Hagen, Martin, 2023. "Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 281-298.
    8. Toshihiro Tsuchihashi, 2021. "A buyout option alleviates implicit collusion in uniform‐price auctions," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(5), pages 1146-1155, July.

  2. Burkett, Justin & Woodward, Kyle, 2020. "Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 297-306.

    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Teytelboym & Shengwu Li & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour & Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(3), pages 709-750, July.
    2. Burkett, Justin & Woodward, Kyle, 2020. "Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    3. Pycia, Marek & Woodward, Kyle, 2021. "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid," CEPR Discussion Papers 15656, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 3 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2021-05-17 2022-01-17 2022-01-31. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2021-05-17 2022-01-17 2022-01-31. Author is listed
  3. NEP-DES: Economic Design (2) 2021-05-17 2022-01-17. Author is listed
  4. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (2) 2022-01-17 2022-01-31. Author is listed
  5. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2022-01-17. Author is listed
  6. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2022-01-17. Author is listed

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