Yuji Fujinaka

Personal Details

First Name:	Yuji
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Fujinaka
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pfu183
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Faculty of Economics
Kansai University

Osaka, Japan
http://www.kansai-u.ac.jp/Fc_eco/
RePEc:edi:feknsjp (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Yuji Fujinaka, 2008. "A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Fair Division," ISER Discussion Paper 0721, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

   Cited by:

   1. Kazuhiko Hashimoto, 2015. "Strategy-Proof Rule in Probabilistic Allocation Problem of an Indivisible Good and Money," ISER Discussion Paper 0931, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
   2. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Yu Nakayama, 2016. "Strategy-Proofness on Bankruptcy Problems with an Indivisible Object," ISER Discussion Paper 0961, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

2. Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2008. "Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets," ISER Discussion Paper 0727, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Feb 2009.
   • Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2011. "Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(1), pages 147-169, September.

   Cited by:

   1. Harless, Patrick & Phan, William, 2022. "Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 73-89.
   2. Fujinaka, Yuji & Miyakawa, Toshiji, 2020. "Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 157-164.
   3. Katsuhiko Nishizaki, 2014. "An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(1), pages 73-82, March.
   4. Bochet, Olivier & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2010. "Secure implementation in allotment economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 35-49, January.
   5. Hagiwara Makoto, 2023. "Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex-Post Equilibria with Private Values," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 23(2), pages 663-678, June.
      • Makoto Hagiwara, 2019. "Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex Post Equilibria with Private Values," Discussion Paper Series DP2019-13, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, revised Aug 2019.
   6. Nishizaki, Katsuhiko, 2018. "Secure implementability under Pareto-efficient rules in linear production economies with classical preferences," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-383.
   7. Kazuhiko Hashimoto, 2018. "Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(4), pages 1045-1078, June.
   8. Rodrigo A. Velez & Alexander L. Brown, 2019. "Empirical strategy-proofness," Papers 1907.12408, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
   9. Katsuhiko Nishizaki, 2013. "An impossibility theorem for secure implementation in discrete public good economies," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 300-308.

3. Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2007. "Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money," ISER Discussion Paper 0699, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
   • Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2008. "Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 91-95, July.

   Cited by:

   1. Katsuhiko Nishizaki, 2014. "An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(1), pages 73-82, March.
   2. Bochet, Olivier & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2010. "Secure implementation in allotment economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 35-49, January.
   3. Nishizaki, Katsuhiko, 2018. "Secure implementability under Pareto-efficient rules in linear production economies with classical preferences," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-383.
   4. Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2008. "Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets," ISER Discussion Paper 0727, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Feb 2009.
      • Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2011. "Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(1), pages 147-169, September.
   5. Adachi, Tsuyoshi, 2014. "Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 96-101.
   6. Rajnish Kumar, 2011. "Secure Implementation in Production Economies," Departmental Working Papers 2011-02, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
      • Kumar, Rajnish, 2013. "Secure implementation in production economies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 372-378.
   7. Katsuhiko Nishizaki, 2013. "An impossibility theorem for secure implementation in discrete public good economies," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 300-308.
   8. Yuji Fujinaka & Toyotaka Sakai, 2009. "The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 325-348, November.

Articles

1. Fujinaka, Yuji & Miyakawa, Toshiji, 2020. "Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 157-164.

   Cited by:

   1. Mariya Halushka, 2021. "Obviously Strategy-proof Mechanism Design With Rich Private Information," Working Papers 2104E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.

2. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2018. "Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 187-202.

   Cited by:

   1. Yajing Chen & Zhenhua Jiao & Chenfeng Zhang & Luosai Zhang, 2021. "The Machiavellian frontier of top trading cycles," Papers 2106.14456, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
   2. Fujinaka, Yuji & Miyakawa, Toshiji, 2020. "Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 157-164.
   3. Siwei Chen & Yajing Chen & Chia-Ling Hsu, 2021. "New axioms for top trading cycles," Papers 2104.09157, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2021.
   4. Yuki Tamura, 2022. "Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 537-565, November.
   5. Chen, Yajing & Zhao, Fang, 2021. "Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
   6. Di Feng, 2023. "Endowments-swapping-proofness and Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets," Discussion Paper Series DP2023-14, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
   7. Jingsheng Yu & Jun Zhang, 2020. "Efficient and fair trading algorithms in market design environments," Papers 2005.06878, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.

3. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2015. "Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 165-185.

   Cited by:

   1. Bosmans, K.G.M. & Öztürk, Z.E., 2013. "An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy," Research Memorandum 063, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
      • Kristof Bosmans & Z. Emel Öztürk, 2018. "An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(2), pages 247-264, February.
   2. Rodrigo A. Velez & Antonio Nicolo, 2016. "Divide and compromise," Working Papers 20160710-001, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics.
      • Nicolò, Antonio & Velez, Rodrigo A., 2017. "Divide and compromise," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 100-110.
   3. Rodrigo A. Velez, 2017. "Equitable rent division," Working Papers 20170818-001, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics.
   4. Decerf, Benoit & Van der Linden, Martin, 2021. "Manipulability in school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
   5. Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars, 2021. "An Algorithm for Identifying Least Manipulable Envy-Free and Budget-Balanced Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities," Working Papers 2021:2, Lund University, Department of Economics.
      • Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers, 2022. "An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 50-60, March.
   6. Yamamura, Hirofumi, 2016. "Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: An application of the minimax theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 48-57.
   7. Rodrigo A. Velez, 2017. "Sharing an increase of the rent fairly," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 59-80, January.
      • Rodrigo A. Velez, 2015. "Sharing an increase of the rent fairly," Working Papers 20151201-001, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics.
   8. DECERF, Benoit & VAN DER LINDEN, Martin, 2016. "A criterion to compare mechanisms when solutions are not unique, with applications to constrained school choice," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2016033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   9. David Pérez-Castrillo & Marilda Sotomayor, 2017. "On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer–seller markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1137-1161, November.
   10. Velez, Rodrigo A., 2023. "Equitable rent division on a soft budget," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 1-14.
   11. Rodrigo A. Velez, 2019. "Expressive mechanisms for equitable rent division on a budget," Papers 1902.02935, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2020.

4. Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2011. "Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(1), pages 147-169, September.
   • Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2008. "Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets," ISER Discussion Paper 0727, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Feb 2009.
   See citations under working paper version above.
5. Yuji Fujinaka & Toyotaka Sakai, 2009. "The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 325-348, November.

   Cited by:

   1. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2015. "Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 165-185.
   2. C. Gizem Korpeoglu, 2018. "Allocation of an indivisible object on the full preference domain: axiomatic characterizations," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(1), pages 41-53, April.
   3. Toyotaka Sakai, 2012. "Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(2), pages 499-521, June.
   4. Yamamura, Hirofumi, 2016. "Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: An application of the minimax theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 48-57.
   5. Satoshi Nakada, 2018. "Envy-free allocation of indivisible goods with money and externalities," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(1), pages 52-59.
   6. Yuji Fujinaka & Toyotaka Sakai, 2007. "The Manipulability of Fair Solutions in Assignment of an Indivisible Object with Monetary Transfers," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(6), pages 993-1011, December.
   7. Conan Mukherjee, 2014. "Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 289-311, February.

6. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2008. "Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 91-95, July.
   • Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2007. "Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money," ISER Discussion Paper 0699, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
   See citations under working paper version above.
7. Yuji Fujinaka & Toyotaka Sakai, 2007. "The Manipulability of Fair Solutions in Assignment of an Indivisible Object with Monetary Transfers," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(6), pages 993-1011, December.

   Cited by:

   1. Carmen Beviá, 2010. "Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 209-222, March.
      • Carmen Beviá, 2009. "Manipulation Games in Economics with Indivisible Goods," Working Papers 371, Barcelona School of Economics.
   2. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2015. "Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 165-185.
   3. Yuji Fujinaka, 2008. "A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Fair Division," ISER Discussion Paper 0721, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
   4. Toyotaka Sakai, 2012. "Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(2), pages 499-521, June.
   5. Yamamura, Hirofumi, 2016. "Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: An application of the minimax theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 48-57.
   6. Kazuhiko Hashimoto, 2018. "Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(4), pages 1045-1078, June.
   7. Toyotaka Sakai, 2013. "An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(1), pages 17-26, March.
   8. Toyotaka Sakai, 2008. "Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 347-356, November.
   9. Hirofumi Yamamura & Ryo Kawasaki, 2013. "Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 815-832, March.
   10. Conan Mukherjee, 2014. "Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 289-311, February.

8. Fujinaka, Yuji & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 253-258, February.

   Cited by:

   1. Hagen, Martin, 2019. "Collusion-proof and fair auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
   2. Yuji Fujinaka, 2008. "A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Fair Division," ISER Discussion Paper 0721, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
   3. Ando, Kazutoshi & Kato, Miki & Ohseto, Shinji, 2008. "Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 14-23, January.
   4. Toyotaka Sakai, 2012. "Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(2), pages 499-521, June.
   5. Miki Kato & Shinji Ohseto & Shohei Tamura, 2015. "Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 195-207, February.
   6. Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2007. "Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money," ISER Discussion Paper 0699, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
      • Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2008. "Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 91-95, July.
   7. Yuji Fujinaka & Toyotaka Sakai, 2009. "The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 325-348, November.

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