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Stable Marketing Cooperation in a Differential Game for an Oligopoly

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  • Mario A. García-Meza

    (Facultad de Economía, Contaduría y Administración, Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango, Fanny Anitua y Priv. de la Loza s/n, Durango, Durango 34000, México)

  • Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova

    (Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, St. Petersburg State University, Universitetskii Prospekt 35, Petergof, Saint Petersburg 198504, Russia)

  • José Daniel López-Barrientos

    (Facultad de Ciencias Actuariales, Universidad Anáhuac México, Campus Norte, Av. Universidad Anáhuac, 46, Col. Lomas Anáhuac, Huixquilucan, Edo. de México 52786, México)

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of an oligopoly playing an advertising game of goodwill accumulation with random terminal time. The goal is to find a cooperative solution that is time-consistent, considering a dynamic accumulation of goodwill with depreciation for a finite number of firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario A. García-Meza & Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova & José Daniel López-Barrientos, 2018. "Stable Marketing Cooperation in a Differential Game for an Oligopoly," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(03), pages 1-18, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:20:y:2018:i:03:n:s0219198917500281
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198917500281
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Reynolds, Stanley S., 1991. "Dynamic oligopoly with capacity adjustment costs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 491-514, July.
    2. Petrosjan, Leon & Zaccour, Georges, 2003. "Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 381-398, January.
    3. Jørgensen, Steffen & Gromova, Ekaterina, 2016. "Sustaining cooperation in a differential game of advertising goodwill accumulation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 254(1), pages 294-303.
    4. Gromova, Ekaterina V. & Tur, Anna V. & Balandina, Lidiya I., 2016. "A game-theoretic model of pollution control with asymmetric time horizons," Conference Papers 11933, Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University.
    5. Fershtman, Chaim, 1984. "Goodwill and Market Shares in Oligopoly," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 51(23), pages 271-281, August.
    6. Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova & José Daniel López-Barrientos, 2016. "A Differential Game Model for The Extraction of Nonrenewable Resources with Random Initial Times — The Cooperative and Competitive Cases," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(02), pages 1-19, June.
    7. Frank M. Bass & Anand Krishnamoorthy & Ashutosh Prasad & Suresh P. Sethi, 2005. "Generic and Brand Advertising Strategies in a Dynamic Duopoly," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(4), pages 556-568, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mario Alberto García-Meza, 2021. "The Cost of Work Discrimination: A Market Capture Differential Game Model," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(19), pages 1-10, September.

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