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Shapley Value In A Model Of Information Transferal

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  • PATRICIA LUCIA GALDEANO

    (Departamento de Matemáticas, Facultad de Ciencias Físico Matemáticas y Naturales, Instituto de Matemática Aplicada, Universidad Nacional de San Luis y CONICET, Ejército de los Andes 950. 5700, San Luis, Argentina)

  • JORGE OVIEDO

    (Departamento de Matemáticas, Facultad de Ciencias Físico Matemáticas y Naturales, Instituto de Matemática Aplicada, Universidad Nacional de San Luis y CONICET, Ejército de los Andes 950. 5700, San Luis, Argentina)

  • LUIS GUILLERMO QUINTAS

    (Departamento de Matemáticas, Facultad de Ciencias Físico Matemáticas y Naturales, Instituto de Matemática Aplicada, Universidad Nacional de San Luis y CONICET, Ejército de los Andes 950. 5700, San Luis, Argentina)

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the value of the information in a cooperative model. There is an agent (the innovator), having relevant information which can be sold to some potential buyers. Thenpotential users of the information share a market. The expected utility of each of them can be improved by obtaining the information. The whole situation is modelled as a(n + 1)–person cooperative game.We study the properties of the characteristic function of this game. It fulfills a weak version of the superadditivity property, namely 0-monotonicity. The game is proved to be monotonic.We compute the Shapley value and we prove it is an imputation for the game. We compare the Shapley value with the equilibrium studied in a noncooperative model by Quintas (1995). We also study some limit cases when the potential buyers are completely informed or uninformed. It includes Big Boss Games (Mutoet al.(1988)) and other limit cases.We conclude that in a cooperative environment the buyers avoid being exploited by the innovator. Conversely the innovator obtains a higher utility in a noncooperative game.

Suggested Citation

  • Patricia Lucia Galdeano & Jorge Oviedo & Luis Guillermo Quintas, 2010. "Shapley Value In A Model Of Information Transferal," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(01), pages 19-35.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:01:n:s0219198910002490
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198910002490
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Geoffroy de Clippel & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1413-1436, November.
    2. Stamatopoulos, Giorgos & Tauman, Yair, 2008. "Licensing of a quality-improving innovation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 410-438, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Models of information transferal; cooperative games; 0-monotonicity; Shapley value; C71;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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