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R&D incentives and competitive pressure under hidden information

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  • Maria G. Romano

Abstract

Within a principal‐agent model, the paper studies how hidden information affects incentives to invest in demand‐enhancing R&D of a firm competing in the product market. The analysis shows that, when the R&D outcome is private information of the innovating firm not only compared to its competitor, but also relative to its supplier, a contractual cost arises which neutralizes the standard strategic benefit of R&D and reduces the incentives to invest. Moreover, within this setting, more intense competition always stifles innovation.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria G. Romano, 2021. "R&D incentives and competitive pressure under hidden information," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(1), pages 56-78, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:88:y:2021:i:1:p:56-78
    DOI: 10.1002/soej.12503
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    References listed on IDEAS

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