Oligopolistic Screening and Two-way distortion
AbstractWe analyze the choice of incentive contracts by olipolistic ?rms that compete on the product market. Managers have private information and in the ?rst stage they exert cost reducing e¤ort. In equilibrium the standard ?no distortion at the top? property disappears and two way distortions are optimal. We extend our analysis to other informational, contractual and competitive settings.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 200.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision: Nov 2010
oligopoly; screening; two way distortion; incentives; investments;
Other versions of this item:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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