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Pyramids and the value of generality

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  • Pauline Westerman

Abstract

Responsive Regulation advocates a differentiated style of regulation and enforcement that is more responsive to the behavior of the regulated parties than a system of general or uniform rules. This article investigates whether such a differentiated approach can be reconciled with the traditional ideal of general law. On the basis of a conceptual analysis of generality, it is argued that the notion of generality is at best tautological and not inconsistent with a differentiated approach to regulation and enforcement. However, the value of generality is based on the assumption that rules function as reasons, rather than as instructions. As reasons, rules need not comprise large categories, but they do need to last for a long period of time. The conclusion drawn is that flexibility (rather than differentiation) is hard to reconcile with the notion of rules as reasons, although it may be demanded by a notion of rules as effective implementers of policies.

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  • Pauline Westerman, 2013. "Pyramids and the value of generality," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(1), pages 80-94, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:7:y:2013:i:1:p:80-94
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2012.01155.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kaplow, Louis, 1995. "A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 150-163, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Netta Barak‐Corren & Yael Kariv‐Teitelbaum, 2021. "Behavioral responsive regulation: Bringing together responsive regulation and behavioral public policy," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(S1), pages 163-182, November.

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