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Judicial Self‐Governance Index: Towards better understanding of the role of judges in governing the judiciary

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  • Katarína Šipulová
  • Samuel Spáč
  • David Kosař
  • Tereza Papoušková
  • Viktor Derka

Abstract

The aim of this article is to introduce a novel view on how to evaluate the share of power held by judges in judicial governance. Its contribution to court administration and the regulation of judges is three‐fold. First, it provides a novel empirically tested conceptualization of judicial governance that includes 60 competences grouped into eight dimensions (ranging from selection and education of judges to case allocation and publication of judicial decisions). Second, it proposes a new Judicial Self‐Governance (JSG) Index that measures how much power domestic judges hold in these eight dimensions of judicial governance. Third, by applying the JSG Index to the longitudinal data for Germany, Italy, Czechia, and Slovakia this article demonstrates that the Judicial Council model is not the only institutional model of judicial governance leading to the empowerment of judges. This means that judges can hold many powers without the existence of judicial councils and even in the Ministry of Justice model.

Suggested Citation

  • Katarína Šipulová & Samuel Spáč & David Kosař & Tereza Papoušková & Viktor Derka, 2023. "Judicial Self‐Governance Index: Towards better understanding of the role of judges in governing the judiciary," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(1), pages 22-42, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:17:y:2023:i:1:p:22-42
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12453
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