IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/reggov/v10y2016i4p384-398.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Is the SEC a learning regulator? Lessons from proxy access

Author

Listed:
  • Aviv Pichhadze

Abstract

Analysis of the US Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) treatment of the concept of ownership in the federal proxy rules, between 1934 and 2010, suggests SEC systems and procedures may not employ optimal organizational learning. Addressing this, I develop the Learning Regulator Framework, a normative model facilitating organizational learning and allowing regulatory agencies to maintain awareness of, and adaptation to, socio‐economic realities in regulated environments, thereby promoting reflective, responsive, relevant, and efficient regulatory frameworks. The relevance of the model to other institutional settings is also considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Aviv Pichhadze, 2016. "Is the SEC a learning regulator? Lessons from proxy access," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(4), pages 384-398, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:10:y:2016:i:4:p:384-398
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12015
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12015
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/rego.12015?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Oliver E. Williamson, 2005. "The Economics of Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 1-18, May.
    3. K. J. Arrow, 1971. "The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: F. H. Hahn (ed.), Readings in the Theory of Growth, chapter 11, pages 131-149, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. Carpenter, Daniel P., 2004. "Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 613-631, November.
    5. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    6. Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. "Reference points, anchors, norms, and mixed feelings," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 296-312, March.
    7. Pound, John, 1991. "Proxy voting and the SEC*1: Investor protection versus market efficiency," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 241-285, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mountain, Bruce R., 2019. "Ownership, regulation, and financial disparity: The case of electricity distribution in Australia," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 1-1.
    2. Ando, Amy, 1998. "Delay on the Path to the Endangered Species List: Do Costs and Benefits Matter," RFF Working Paper Series dp-97-43-rev, Resources for the Future.
    3. William C. Mitchell, 1990. "Interest Groups: Economic Perspectives and Contributions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(1), pages 85-108, January.
    4. Phares, Jonathan & Dobrzykowski, David D. & Prohofsky, Jodi, 2021. "How policy is shaping the macro healthcare delivery supply chain: The emergence of a new tier of retail medical clinics," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 333-345.
    5. Oleh Pasko, 2018. "Theories of Regulation in the Context of Modern Practice of Accounting Regulation," Oblik i finansi, Institute of Accounting and Finance, issue 2, pages 37-46, June.
    6. Zheying Wu & Robert Salomon, 2017. "Deconstructing the liability of foreignness: Regulatory enforcement actions against foreign banks," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 48(7), pages 837-861, September.
    7. Elvio Accinelli & Osvaldo Salas, 2019. "El estado de bienestar como un bien público no excluible / The welfare state as a public good not excludable," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 34(2), pages 243-273.
    8. Lawrence J. White, 2000. "Reducing the Barriers to International Trade in Accounting Services: Why it Matters, and the Road Ahead," Working Papers 00-04, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    9. Ray Ball, 2009. "Market and Political/Regulatory Perspectives on the Recent Accounting Scandals," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 277-323, May.
    10. Anna Dimitrova, 2021. "Captured Energy Market Operation and Liberalization Efforts," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 7, pages 19-31.
    11. Rebecca Slayton & Aaron Clark‐Ginsberg, 2018. "Beyond regulatory capture: Coproducing expertise for critical infrastructure protection," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(1), pages 115-130, March.
    12. Matthew D. Mitchell, 2019. "Uncontestable favoritism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 167-190, October.
    13. Krisztina Antal-Pomázi, 2020. "Corporate Interest in Antitrust Enforcement," Proceedings of Economics and Finance Conferences 10912816, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences.
    14. Simshauser, P., 2020. "Merchant utilities and boundaries of the firm: vertical integration in energy-only markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2039, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    15. Helland, Eric & Sykuta, Michael, 2004. "Regulation and the Evolution of Corporate Boards: Monitoring, Advising, or Window Dressing?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(1), pages 167-193, April.
    16. Omer Moav & Zvika Neeman, 2004. "Inspection in Markets for Experience Goods," Discussion Paper Series dp349, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    17. Quach, Sara & Thaichon, Park & Hewege, Chandana, 2020. "Triadic relationship between customers, service providers and government in a highly regulated industry," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    18. Niels J. Philipsen, 2010. "Regulation Of Liberal Professions And Competition Policy: Developments In The Eu And China," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 203-231.
    19. Simshauser, Paul & Akimov, Alexandr, 2019. "Regulated electricity networks, investment mistakes in retrospect and stranded assets under uncertainty," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 117-133.
    20. Justin Rex, 2020. "Anatomy of agency capture: An organizational typology for diagnosing and remedying capture," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(2), pages 271-294, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:10:y:2016:i:4:p:384-398. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1748-5991 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.