Pedro Garcia-del-Barrio (Department of Economics, University of Navarra, Edificio Bibliotecas (entrada Este), Pamplona, Spain) Francesc Pujol (Department of Economics, University of Navarra, Edificio Bibliotecas (entrada Este), Pamplona, Spain)
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In labor markets where few companies compete for many workers, economic theory predicts monopsony rents. Surprisingly, soccer clubs do not profit from the expected rents. The purpose of this study is to explain such contradictory evidence.
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