Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Explaining clustering in social networks: towards an evolutionary theory of cascading benefits

Contents:

Author Info

  • Sheen S. Levine

    (Management Department, Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178899, Singapore)

  • Robert Kurzban

    (Department of Psychology, 3720 Walnut Street, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Individual and organizational actors enter into a large number of relationships that include benefiting others without ensuring the equality of reciprocal benefits. We suggest that actors have evolved mechanisms that guide them in the choice of exchange partners, even without conscious calculation or bookkeeping of gain and loss. One such mechanism directs actors to membership in clusters, which are homogenous groups of actors densely connected among themselves and only loosely connected to other groups. We suggest that clusters offer network externalities, which are not possible in sparse networks, thus conferring cascading benefits on the actors contained in those clusters. Using this logic, one can understand the omnipresence of clustering in social networks of individuals and firms. We review the benefits and challenges associated with clustering and use the logic of cascading benefits to derive empirical predictions. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1291
    File Function: Link to full text; subscription required
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Managerial and Decision Economics.

    Volume (Year): 27 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 2-3 ()
    Pages: 173-187

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:173-187

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Joel A. C. Baum & Andrew V. Shipilov & Tim J. Rowley, 2003. "Where do small worlds come from?," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 697-725, August.
    2. Cameron, Lisa A, 1999. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 47-59, January.
    3. Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2000-02, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    4. Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, 1998. "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 569-596, May.
    5. Sorenson, Olav & Rivkin, Jan W. & Fleming, Lee, 2006. "Complexity, networks and knowledge flow," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(7), pages 994-1017, September.
    6. Levinthal, Daniel & March, James G., 1981. "A model of adaptive organizational search," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 307-333, December.
    7. Michael Prietula & Kathleen Carley & Les Gasser (ed.), 1998. "Simulating Organizations: Computational Models of Institutions and Groups," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026266108x, December.
    8. Martin J. Conyon & Mark R. Muldoon, 2006. "The Small World of Corporate Boards," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(9-10), pages 1321-1343.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:173-187. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.