Pushing lenders to over-comply with environmental regulations: A developing country perspective
AbstractIn the past few years, the number of lenders adopting voluntary environmental codes, such as the Equator Principles, is increasing. The main reasons for this form of over-compliance include warm glow preferences of agents, credit risk and incentives arising from regulation. Empirical evidence suggests that lenders that over-comply are generally bigger than those that don't. In particular, they are likely to be MNCs. In addition, the behaviour of over-complying lenders differs from other lenders, for instance they are more likely to incorporate environmental risks in their lending practices. In the context of developing countries, incentives that promote over-compliance exist to much lesser degree. Analysing the regulatory environment in developing countries, we find no compelling reason for regulators to encourage voluntary initiatives such as the Equator Principles. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Journal of International Development.
Volume (Year): 22 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/5102/home
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Donald F. Vitaliano & Gregory Stella, 2004.
"The Cost of Corporate Social Responsibility: The Case of the Community Reinvestment Act,"
Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics
0412, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Department of Economics.
- Donald Vitaliano & Gregory Stella, 2006. "The cost of Corporate Social Responsibility: the case of the Community Reinvestment Act," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 235-244, December.
- Reinhardt, Forest L. & Stavins, Robert N. & Vietor, Richard H. K., 2008.
"Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens,"
- Forest L. Reinhardt & Robert N. Stavins & Richard H. K. Vietor, 2008. "Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 219-239, Summer.
- Forest L. Reinhardt & Robert N. Stavins & Richard H. K. Vietor, 2008. "Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens," NBER Working Papers 13989, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Reinhardt, Forest L. & Stavins, Robert N. & Vietor, Richard H.K., 2008. "Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens," Discussion Papers dp-08-12, Resources For the Future.
- Stavins, Robert & Reinhardt, Forest & Vietor, Richard, 2008. "Corporate Social Responsibility through an Economic Lens," Working Paper Series rwp08-023, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Robert N. Stavins & Forest L. Reinhardt & Richard H. K. Vietor, 2008. "Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens," Working Papers 2008.84, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- John W. Maxwell & Thomas P Lyon & Steven C.. Hackett, 1995.
"Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism,"
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
122, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Maxwell, John W & Lyon, Thomas P & Hackett, Steven C, 2000. "Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 583-617, October.
- Heyes, Anthony, 2000. "Implementing Environmental Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 107-29, March.
- Grossman, Gene M & Krueger, Alan B, 1995.
"Economic Growth and the Environment,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 110(2), pages 353-77, May.
- R. Brau & C. Carraro, 2004. "The economic analysis of voluntary approaches to environmental protection. A survey," Working Paper CRENoS 200420, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
- Gregory Elliehausen, 1998. "The cost of banking regulation: a review of the evidence," Staff Studies 171, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Khan, M. & Matsusaka, J.G., 1995.
"Demand for Environment Goods: Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives,"
1995_08, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- Kahn, Matthew E & Matsusaka, John G, 1997. "Demand for Environmental Goods: Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 137-73, April.
- Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, 2002. "Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 157-184, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.