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Executions, Deterrence, and Homicide: A Tale of Two Cities

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  • Franklin E. Zimring
  • Jeffrey Fagan
  • David T. Johnson

Abstract

We compare homicide rates in two quite similar cities with vastly different execution risks. Singapore had an execution rate close to one per million per year until an explosive 20‐fold increase in 1994–1995 and 1996 to a level that we show was probably the highest in the world. Then, over the next 11 years, Singapore executions dropped by about 95 percent. Hong Kong, by contrast, had no executions at all during the last generation and abolished capital punishment in 1993. Homicide levels and trends are remarkably similar in these two cities over the 35 years after 1973, with neither the surge in Singapore executions nor the more recent steep drop producing any differential impact. By comparing two closely matched places with huge contrasts in actual execution but no differences in homicide trends, we have generated a unique test of the exuberant claims of deterrence that have been produced over the past decade in the United States.

Suggested Citation

  • Franklin E. Zimring & Jeffrey Fagan & David T. Johnson, 2010. "Executions, Deterrence, and Homicide: A Tale of Two Cities," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(1), pages 1-29, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:7:y:2010:i:1:p:1-29
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1740-1461.2009.01168.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Gabriel Costeira Machado & Cristiano Aguiar De Oliveira, 2018. "The Deterrent Effects Of Brazillian Child Labor Law," Anais do XLIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 44th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 237, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].

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