Crime Rates and Expected Sanctions: The Economics of Deterrence Revisited
Abstractthe effects of the crime rate on the expected sanction. It turns out that these effects are versatile and rich, both in the direction and the magnitude of their influence on the expected sanction. After analyzing these counter effects of the crime rate on the expected sanction, we present a new model of deterrence, which explicitly incorporates the crime rate as one of the determinants of the expected sanction. The adjusted model is then used to study the effects of the crime rate on deterrence and on optimal law enforcement policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number 00-14.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/foerder.asp
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RESEARCH ; CRIMES ; POLITICS;
Other versions of this item:
- Bar-Gill, Oren & Harel, Alon, 2001. "Crime Rates and Expected Sanctions: The Economics of Deterrence Revisited," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 485-501, Part I Ju.
- Bar-Gill, O. & Harel, A., 2000. "Crime Rates and Expected Sanctions: The Economics of Deterrence Revisited," Papers 2000-14, Tel Aviv.
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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