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IMF Programmes: Is there a conditionality Laffer Curve?

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  • Graham Bird

Abstract

The long-standing debate over IMF conditionality has received a new lease of life in the context of the debate over a new international financial architecture. Conditionality has increased in recent years and some proposals for reform envisage a continuation of this trend. However, by emphasising the importance of implementation as well as design it may be argued that increased conditionality will have a negative effect on final out-turns; there may be a conditionality Laffer curve. The policy issue is whether conditionality has reached or gone beyond its optimal level. There is some evidence that is consistent with the claim that conditionality has become excessive.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by World Economics, Economic & Financial Publishing, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE in its journal World Economics Journal.

Volume (Year): 2 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 29-49

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Handle: RePEc:wej:wldecn:55

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Cited by:
  1. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2010. "Does membership on the UN Security Council influence IMF conditionality?," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 36, Courant Research Centre PEG.
  2. Peter Leeson & Christopher Coyne, 2007. "The reformers’ dilemma: media, policy ownership, and reform," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 237-250, June.
  3. Bird, Graham, 2001. "IMF Programs: Do They Work? Can They be Made to Work Better?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1849-1865, November.
  4. Schaltegger, Christoph & Weder, Martin, 2013. "Fiscal Adjustments and the Probability of Sovereign Default," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79979, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  5. Graham Bird, 2006. "The Implementation of IMF Programs: A Conceptual Framework," School of Economics Discussion Papers 1506, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  6. Ruxanda Berlinschi, 2010. "Reputation concerns in aid conditionality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 433-459, December.
  7. Fabian Fink & Almuth Scholl, 2011. "A Quantitative Model of Sovereign Debt, Bailouts and Conditionality," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2011-46, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  8. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2013. "Politics and IMF Conditionality," CESifo Working Paper Series 4308, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. repec:got:cegedp:104 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Graham Bird, 2004. "Growth, poverty and the IMF," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(4), pages 621-636.

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