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Political Economy Influences Within the Life‐Cycle of IMF Programmes

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  • Graham Bird
  • Dane Rowlands

Abstract

Increasing attention is being paid to political economy dimensions of the IMF's operations. However, up until now, the literature has lacked a systematic overview of how politics and economics interact in this context. This paper sets out to fill the gap. Its conceptual basis is that of the ‘life cycle’ of an IMF programme. What determines the decision to turn to the Fund for financial assistance, what determines the outcome of negotiations, what determines whether a country will come back to the Fund? Answers to these questions cannot be satisfactorily given by examining economics alone. The paper draws on existing evidence to provide an empirically based discussion of the issues involved. It also points the direction in which future research needs to go. Some of the policy implications of the analysis are also examined.

Suggested Citation

  • Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2003. "Political Economy Influences Within the Life‐Cycle of IMF Programmes," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(9), pages 1255-1278, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:worlde:v:26:y:2003:i:9:p:1255-1278
    DOI: 10.1046/j.1467-9701.2003.00572.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Graham Bird, 1988. "An Analysis of Drawings on the International Monetary Fund by Developing Countries," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Managing Global Money, chapter 6, pages 104-112, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Graham Bird, 1998. "The effectiveness of conditionality and the political economy of policy reform: is it simply a matter of political will?," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 89-113.
    3. Tony Killick, 1995. "Structural Adjustment and Poverty Alleviation: An Interpretative Survey," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 26(2), pages 305-330, April.
    4. Conway, Patrick, 1994. "IMF lending programs: Participation and impact," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 365-391, December.
    5. Christian Morrisson, 1996. "The Political Feasibility of Adjustment," OECD Development Centre Policy Briefs 13, OECD Publishing.
    6. Dreher, Axel & Vaubel, Roland, 2000. "Does the IMF cause moral hazard and political business cycles? : Evidence from panel data," Discussion Papers 598, Institut fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Abteilung fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre.
    7. Garuda, Gopal, 2000. "The Distributional Effects of IMF Programs: A Cross-Country Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 1031-1051, June.
    8. Bird, Graham & Hussain, Mumtaz & Joyce, Joseph P., 2004. "Many happy returns? Recidivism and the IMF," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 231-251, March.
    9. Bird, Graham, 2001. "IMF Programs: Do They Work? Can They be Made to Work Better?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1849-1865, November.
    10. John Williamson, 1994. "The Political Economy of Policy Reform," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 68, October.
    11. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2002. "Do IMF Programmes Have a Catalytic Effect on Other International Capital Flows?," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 229-249.
    12. Roland Vaubel, 1996. "Bureaucracy at the IMF and the World Bank: A Comparison of the Evidence," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 195-210, March.
    13. Graham Bird, 2001. "IMF Programmes: Is there a conditionality Laffer Curve?," World Economics, World Economics, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 2(2), pages 29-49, April.
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    2. Giancarlo Corsetti & Aitor Erce & Timothy Uy, 2017. "Official Sector Lending Strategies During the Euro Area Crisis," Discussion Papers 1720, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    3. Copelovitch, Mark & Rickard, Stephanie, 2021. "Partisan technocrats: how leaders matter in international organizations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112215, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Eric Berr & François Combarnous & Eric Rougier, 2005. "Too much consensus could be harmful : measuring the degree of implementation of the Washington consensus and its impact on economic growth," Documents de travail 116, Groupe d'Economie du Développement de l'Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV.
    5. Axel Dreher & Silvia Marchesi & James Raymond Vreeland, 2007. "The Politics of IMF Forecasts," KOF Working papers 07-176, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    6. Giancarlo Corsetti & Aitor Erce & Timothy Uy, 2020. "Official sector lending during the euro area crisis," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 667-705, July.
    7. Jan‐Egbert Sturm & Helge Berger & Jakob De Haan, 2005. "Which Variables Explain Decisions On Imf Credit? An Extreme Bounds Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(2), pages 177-213, July.
    8. Dreher, Axel & Jensen, Nathan M, 2007. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(1), pages 105-124, February.
    9. Cui, Wei, 2017. "Macroeconomic effects of delayed capital liquidation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86156, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. Andersen, Thomas Barnebeck & Harr, Thomas & Tarp, Finn, 2006. "On US politics and IMF lending," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(7), pages 1843-1862, October.
    11. Daniel Nielson, 2013. "Mark Copelovitch. 2010. The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy: Banks, bonds, and bailouts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 117-120, March.
    12. Butkiewicz, James L. & Yanikkaya, Halit, 2005. "The Effects of IMF and World Bank Lending on Long-Run Economic Growth: An Empirical Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 371-391, March.
    13. Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2003. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions," International Finance 0310004, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jan 2004.
    14. Sajid Anwar & Desh Gupta, 2006. "Financial Restructuring and Economic Growth in Thailand," Global Economic Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(1), pages 113-127.
    15. ., 2016. "Introduction and overview: the purposes and operations of the IMF," Chapters, in: The International Monetary Fund, chapter 1, pages 1-18, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Tejesh Pradhan & Mr. Ali J Al-Sadiq, 2018. "IMF-Supported Programs and Income Convergence in Low-Income Countries," IMF Working Papers 2018/284, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Axel Dreher & Roland Vaubel, 2004. "The Causes and Consequences of IMF Conditionality," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(3), pages 26-54, May.
    18. Zeaiter, Hussein Zeaiter, 2013. "Sovereign Debt Defaults: Evidence using Extreme bounds Analysis," Working Papers 32/2013, Universidade Portucalense, Centro de Investigação em Gestão e Economia (CIGE).
    19. Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner & Mauro F. Guillen, 2004. "International Coercion, Emulation and Policy Diffusion: Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-713, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.

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