Political Economy Influences Within the Life-Cycle of IMF Programmes
AbstractIncreasing attention is being paid to political economy dimensions of the IMF's operations. However, up until now, the literature has lacked a systematic overview of how politics and economics interact in this context. This paper sets out to fill the gap. Its conceptual basis is that of the 'life cycle' of an IMF programme. What determines the decision to turn to the Fund for financial assistance, what determines the outcome of negotiations, what determines whether a country will come back to the Fund? Answers to these questions cannot be satisfactorily given by examining economics alone. The paper draws on existing evidence to provide an empirically based discussion of the issues involved. It also points the direction in which future research needs to go. Some of the policy implications of the analysis are also examined. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003.
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Volume (Year): 26 (2003)
Issue (Month): 9 (09)
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