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Resource Rent in Individual Quota Fisheries

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  • Frank Asche
  • Trond Bjørndal
  • Daniel V. Gordon

Abstract

Traditional fisheries management schemes generate incentives for vessels to maximize catch, resulting in rent dissipation and overcapacity. Individual vessel quota management schemes change the incentives to maximize profit and have the potential to generate resource rent and reduce capacity. An interesting question is whether it is the changed incentives due to individual quota or the capacity reduction due to transferability of individual quota that is most important in generating rent. In this study, a cost function approach is used to model and measure rent generated and potential rent in a fishery managed with individual vessel quotas.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Land Economics.

Volume (Year): 85 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 279-291

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Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:85:y:2009:i:2:p:279-291

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Web page: http://le.uwpress.org/

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Cited by:
  1. Sigbjorn Tveteras & Carlos Paredes & Julio Peña, 2011. "Individual Fishing Quotas in Peru: Stopping the Race for Anchovies," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines inv263, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  2. Naoto Jinji, 2011. "Fisheries Subsidies and Management in Open Economies," Discussion papers, Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University e-11-004, Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University.
  3. Diekert , Florian & Lund , Kristen & Schweder, Tore, 2014. "From Open-Access to Individual Quotas: Disentangling the Effects of Policy Reform and Environmental Changes in the Norwegian Coastal Cod Fishery," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics 07/2014, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  4. Squires, Dale & Jeon, Yongil & Grafton, R. Quentin & Kirkley, James, 2010. "Controlling excess capacity in common-pool resource industries: the transition from input to output controls," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 54(3), September.
  5. Solís, Daniel & del Corral, Julio & Perruso, Larry & Agar, Juan J., 2014. "Evaluating the impact of individual fishing quotas (IFQs) on the technical efficiency and composition of the US Gulf of Mexico red snapper commercial fishing fleet," Food Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 74-83.

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