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Understanding the Effects of Antiprofiling Policies

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  • Paul Heaton

Abstract

Many police agencies have enacted measures designed to reduce racial profiling, yet little empirical evidence exists regarding the effects of such programs. This article uses the occurrence of a racial profiling scandal in New Jersey to quantify the effect of a move toward race-neutral policing. The scandal and subsequent reforms led to an estimated 16-33 percent decrease in annual arrests of minorities for motor vehicle theft. I also present evidence that, as policing against minorities decreased, motor vehicle theft increased in areas populated by minorities. My implied elasticities do not suggest that minorities respond to policing intensity differently than the general population. New Jersey data generate little strong evidence of additional adverse responses by minorities to lessened police scrutiny. The findings are robust to a number of specification checks, and similar patterns are observable in Maryland, a state that experienced a profiling scandal several years before New Jersey. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

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  • Paul Heaton, 2010. "Understanding the Effects of Antiprofiling Policies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 29-64, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:53:y:2010:i:1:p:29-64
    DOI: 10.1086/649645
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    1. Shi, Lan, 2009. "The limit of oversight in policing: Evidence from the 2001 Cincinnati riot," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 99-113, February.
    2. Ana María Ibánez & Amy Ritterbusch & Catherine Rodríguez, 2017. "Impact of a Judicial System Reform on Police Behavior: Evidence on Juvenile Crime in Colombia," Documentos CEDE 15428, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    3. Long, Wei, 2019. "How does oversight affect police? Evidence from the police misconduct reform," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 94-118.
    4. Mechoulan, Stéphane, 2020. "Civil unrest, emergency powers, and spillover effects: A mixed methods analysis of the 2005 French riots," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 305-326.
    5. Cheng, Cheng & Long, Wei, 2022. "The effect of highly publicized police killings on policing: Evidence from large U.S. cities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    6. Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, 2010. "The Deterrent Effect of Imprisonment," NBER Chapters, in: Controlling Crime: Strategies and Tradeoffs, pages 43-94, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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