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Employment Relations in Dual Labor Markets (" It's Nice Work If You Can Get It")

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  • Oi, Walter Y

Abstract

Jobs in big firms command higher wages. The author examines four theories that could explain this relation. First, large firms incur higher fixed employment costs including more specific training. Second, monitoring costs are greater in big firms and can be spread by hiring more productive workers. Third, large firms may choose to pay efficiency wages to deter shirking. Finally, large employers organize production around teams and pay higher wages to get workers who comply with the discipline of team production. The dispersion of wages and working conditions in the U.S. labor market reflect the heterogeneity of jobs (employment relations) and individuals. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.

Volume (Year): 8 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: S124-49

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:8:y:1990:i:1:p:s124-49

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Cited by:
  1. Idson, T., 1993. "Team Production Effects on Earnings," Discussion Papers 1993_14, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  2. Arnaud Lefranc & Fumiaki Ojima & Takashi Yoshida, 2011. "Intergenerational earnings mobility in Japan among sons and daughters : levels and trends," THEMA Working Papers 2011-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  3. Bruce A. Rayton, 1996. "Rent-Sharing or Incentives? Estimating the Residual Claim of Average Employees," Labor and Demography 9603002, EconWPA, revised 09 Sep 1996.
  4. Arnaud Lefranc & Fumiaki Ojima & Takashi Yoshida, 2014. "Intergenerational earnings mobility in Japan among sons and daughters: levels and trends," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 91-134, January.
  5. Mark Bils & Yongsung Chang, 1999. "Wages and the Allocation of Hours and Effort," NBER Working Papers 7309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Bils, Mark & Chang, Yongsung, 2003. "Welfare costs of sticky wages when effort can respond," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 311-330, March.
  7. Bils Marks & Chang Yongsung, 2001. "Cyclical Movements in Hours and Effort Under Sticky Wages-super-," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 1-26, June.
  8. Yongsung Chang & Mark Bils, 2002. "Cyclical Movements in Hours and Effort under Sticky Wages," Macroeconomics 0204004, EconWPA.
  9. Rayton, Bruce A., 2003. "The residual claim of rank and file employees," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 129-148, January.
  10. Adamchik, A. & Bedi, A.S., 2001. "Persistence of the gender pay differential in a transition economy," ISS Working Papers - General Series 19091, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
  11. Kertesi, Gábor & Köllő, János, 2003. "Ágazati bérkülönbségek Magyarországon, II. rész. Járadékokon való osztozkodás koncentrált ágazatokban, szakszervezeti aktivitás jelenlétében
    [Pay differentials between industries in
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1049-1074.
  12. Kertesi, Gábor & Köllő, János, 2003. "Ágazati bérkülönbségek Magyarországon, I. rész. Az ágazati járadékképződés alternatív modelljei
    [Pay differentials between industries in Hungary. I. The basic models]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 923-938.

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