This paper empirically investigates the political business cycle hypothesis for Japan, taking into account the potential two-way interaction that originates from the control (within certain limitations) by the government over election timing of Japanese elections. Using a mixed qualitative and continuous variable simultaneous equation estimation procedure, the authors cannot reject the traditional political business cycle "manipulation" hypothesis (causation running from the timing of elections to real GNP growth). They also find some limited support for the "opportunistic" hypothesis (strong real GNP growth triggers elections). Copyright 1991 by MIT Press.
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Volume (Year): 73 (1991) Issue (Month): 4 (November) Pages: 733-39 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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