Presidential Address: Consequences of Constitutions
AbstractThe paper presents empirical findings regarding the economic policy consequences of constitutional arrangements, in three different dimensions. First, the data are consistent with several theoretical predictions about the consequences of electoral rules and forms of government for fiscal policy and rent extraction, even when non-random constitution selection is taken into account. Second, empirical tests of the predictions from a new comprehensive model of parliamentary democracy show that proportional elections raise government spending through their indirect consequences for party structures and types of government, rather than through their direct effects on policymaking incentives. Third, new empirical results suggest that constitutional arrangements may have important consequences for structural policies that promote long-run economic performance, hinting at a missing link in the causal chain from history to current economic performance. All these empirical findings appear statistically robust, and the estimated effects are large enough to be of genuine economic interest. (JEL: D72, E60, H00, O11) Copyright (c) 2004 The European Economic Association.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.
Volume (Year): 2 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (04/05)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/jeea
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
- H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
- O11 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Cecilia García-Peñalosa & Maty Konte, 2013.
"Why Are Women Less Democratic Than Men? Evidence from Sub-Saharan African Countries,"
- García-Peñalosa, Cecilia & Konte, Maty, 2014. "Why Are Women Less Democratic Than Men? Evidence from Sub-Saharan African Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 104-119.
- García-Peñalosa C. & Konte M., 2014. "Why are women less democratic than men? Evidence from Sub-Saharan African countries," MERIT Working Papers 010, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
- Cecilia García-Peñalosa & Maty Konte, 2013. "Why Are Women Less Democratic Than Men? Evidence from Sub-Saharan African Countries," AMSE Working Papers 1319, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France.
- Cecilia García-Peñalosa & Maty Konte, 2013. "Why are Women less Democratic than Men? Evidence from Sub-Saharan African Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 4524, CESifo Group Munich.
- Cingolani, Luciana & Crombrugghe, Denis de, 2012. "Techniques for dealing with reverse causality between institutions and economic performance," MERIT Working Papers 034, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
- Emmanuel Flachaire & Cecilia Garcìa-Peñalosa & Maty Konte, 2011.
"Political versus Economic Institutions in the Growth Process,"
- Flachaire, Emmanuel & García-Peñalosa, Cecilia & Konte, Maty, 2014. "Political versus economic institutions in the growth process," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 212-229.
- Emmanuel Flachaire & Cecilia García-Peòalosa & Maty Konte, 2011. "Political versus Economic Institutions in the Growth Process," CESifo Working Paper Series 3432, CESifo Group Munich.
- Toke Aidt & Jayasri Dutta & Vania Sena, 2006.
"Governance Regimes, Corruption and Growth: Theory and Evidence,"
15_2006, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy.
- Aidt, Toke & Dutta, Jayasri & Sena, Vania, 2008. "Governance regimes, corruption and growth: Theory and evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-220, June.
- Aidt, T. & Dutta, J. & Vania Sena, 2005. "Growth, Governance and Corruption in the Presence of Threshold Effects: Theory and Evidence," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0540, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Justesen, Mogens K., 2012. "Democracy, dictatorship, and disease: Political regimes and HIV/AIDS," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 373-389.
- Michael Breen & Robert Gillanders, 2012.
"Corruption, institutions and regulation,"
Economics of Governance,
Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 263-285, September.
- Andreas Freytag & Sebastian Voll, 2013. "Institutions and savings in developing and emerging economies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 475-509, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Karie Kirkpatrick).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.