Régulation Et Développement : Une Analyse Théorique À Partir De L’Enforcement Et La Séparation Des Pouvoirs
AbstractThis paper is an attempt to analyze regulation in LDCs taking into account their specificities compared to developed countries. By using a regulation model with an imperfect contract enforcement mechanism, we show how the separation of powers improves the enforcement quality and social welfare in an environment fraught with corruption.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var in its journal Région et Développement.
Volume (Year): 28 (2008)
Issue (Month): ()
JEUX NON COOPÉRATIFS; THÉORIE DU MARCHANDAGE (BARGAINING); ASYMÉTRIE D’INFORMATION ET INFORMATION PRIVÉE; ÉCONOMIE DE LA RÉGULATION;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1994.
"Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior,"
IDEI Working Papers
44, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999. "Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 232-262, Summer.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Meleu, Mathieu, 2001. "Separation of powers and development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 129-145, February.
- Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2000. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement Is a Decision Variable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 119-134, January.
- Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
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