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Régulation Et Développement : Une Analyse Théorique À Partir De L’Enforcement Et La Séparation Des Pouvoirs

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  • Daouda DIAKITÉ

    ()
    (Toulouse School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to analyze regulation in LDCs taking into account their specificities compared to developed countries. By using a regulation model with an imperfect contract enforcement mechanism, we show how the separation of powers improves the enforcement quality and social welfare in an environment fraught with corruption.

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File URL: http://region-developpement.univ-tln.fr/fr/pdf/R28/9-Diakite.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var in its journal Région et Développement.

Volume (Year): 28 (2008)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 181-206

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Handle: RePEc:tou:journl:v:28:y:2008:p:181-206

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Web page: http://regionetdeveloppement.org/
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Keywords: JEUX NON COOPÉRATIFS; THÉORIE DU MARCHANDAGE (BARGAINING); ASYMÉTRIE D’INFORMATION ET INFORMATION PRIVÉE; ÉCONOMIE DE LA RÉGULATION;

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  1. Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2000. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement Is a Decision Variable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 119-134, January.
  2. Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
  3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Meleu, Mathieu, 2001. "Separation of powers and development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 129-145, February.
  4. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1994. "Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior," IDEI Working Papers 44, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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