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Devolution and the Interregional Inequalities in Health and Healthcare in Spain

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Author Info
Joan Costa-Font
Ana Rico

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Abstract

Costa-Font J. and Rico A. (2006) Devolution and the interregional inequalities in health and healthcare in Spain, Regional Studies 40 , 875--887. The desirability of devolution of government responsibilities is often questioned on the grounds of regional cohesion concerns. This feature is especially relevant in welfare policy areas such as healthcare services given their impact on an individual's well-being. This paper examines the effects of health system devolution on the emergence of inter-territorial inequalities in healthcare outcomes (mortality) and outputs (healthcare expenditure) in the Spanish National Health System (NHS). Based on an empirical model for regional health expenditure, and drawing from a battery of inequality indicators (some taken from previous studies, other estimated anew), the following results are obtained. First, healthcare devolution has not led to an expansion of regional inequalities in healthcare outcomes and outputs. Second, there is no clear-cut evidence that devolution increases public health expenditure (in real terms) in devolved region-states, with the exception of fiscally accountable autonomous communities (ACs). Finally, regional health expenditure is explained by differences in need and higher reliance healthcare inputs use, size effects as well as the region-specific economic and demographic dimension in addition to regional income. Costa-Font J. et Rico A. (2006) La régionalisation et les inégalités de santé et des services médicaux en Espagne, Regional Studies 40 , 875--887. Souvent on remet en question les avantages de la régionalisation des compétences gouvernementales en raison des questions qui se posent quant à la cohésion régionale. Cela est particulièrement pertinent dans le domaine des politiques en faveur des services médicaux, étant donné leur impact sur le bien-être de l'individu. Cet article cherche à examiner les retombées de la régionalisation des services de santé sur la naissance des inégalités des résultats des services médicaux (mortalité) et des rendements (dépenses de santé) dans la Sécurité Sociale espagnole. A partir d'un modèle économétrique des dépenses de santé, et puisant dans une batterie d'indices d'inégalité (dont certains proviennent des études antérieures et dont d'autres sont de nouvelles estimations), on obtient les résultats suivants. Primo, la régionalisation des services médicaux n'a entraîné un creusement des inégalités régionales ni des résultats, ni des rendements des services médicaux. Secundo, il reste à prouver que la régionalisation augmente les dépenses de santé publique (en termes réels), à l'exception des AC qui sont fiscalement autonomes. Pour conclure, on explique les dépenses de santé régionales en termes du besoin et de l'utilisation des facteurs médicaux dont on dépend davantage, des effets de taille ainsi que des dimensions économique et démographique spécifiques d'une région en plus du revenu régional. Inégalités régionales Interactions politiques Responsabilité politique Sécu Costa-Font J. und Rico A. (2006) Dezentralisierung und die von Region zu Region zu beobachtenden Unterschiede der Gesundheit und Gesundheitsfürsorge in Spanien, Regional Studies 40 , 875--887. Auf Grund der Besorgnis um regionale Kohäsion fragt man sich oft, ob die Dezentralisierung der Regierungsverantwortlichkeit wünschenswert ist. In Anbetracht der Auswirkung auf das Wohlergehen individueller Personen betrifft dieser Aspekt besonders Aufgabengebiete derWohlfahrtspolitik, wie z.B. Gesundheitsfürsorge. DieserAufsatz untersucht die Wirkung der Dezentralisierung des Gesundheitswesens auf von Region zu Region beobachteten Unterschieden in den Ergebnissen der Gesundheitsfürsorge (Sterblichkeit) und Aufwand (Ausgaben für Gesundheitsfürsorge) im Gesundheitswesen des spanischen Staates (NHS). Gestützt sowohl auf ein empirisches Modell für regionale Gesundheitsausgaben als auch eine Reihe Unterschiedsindikatoren (manche früheren Studien entnommen, andere von neueren Berechnungen) werden folgende Ergebnisse erzielt:erstens, daß die Dezentralisierung der Gesundheitsfürsorge nicht zu einer Ausweitung regionaler Unterschiede der Ergebnisse der Gesundheitsfürsorge geführt hat, und zweitens sich keine eindeutigen Beweise ergaben, daß Dezentralisierung die Ausgaben für das öffentliche Gesundheitswesen mit Ausnahme des finanziell verantwortlichen AC in zentralierten Regionalstaaten (effektiv)gestiegen sind. Abschließend werden regionale Ausgaben für das Gesundheitswesen zusätzlich regionler Einkommen durch Unterschiede in Bedarf und grösserem Verlaß auf Inanspruchnahme des Gesundheitsfürsorgeaufwands, durch Größeneffekte sowie spezifische wirtschaftliche und demographische Dimensionen erklärt. Regionale Unterschiede Politische Wechselwirkungen Politische Verantwortlichkeit NHS Costa-Font J. y Rico A. (2006) Transferencia de competencias y las desigualdades interregionales en la salud y la atención sanitaria en España, Regional Studies 40 , 875--887. A menudo se cuestiona la conveniencia de la transferencia de las competencias del gobierno porque se teme que peligre la cohesión regional. Esta cuestión es especialmente relevante en temas de la política del bienestar tales como los servicios de atención sanitaria, puesto que tienen mucho impacto en el bienestar del individuo. En este artículo examinamos qué efectos ha tenido la transferencia de competencias del sistema de la salud en cuanto a la aparición de desigualdades interterritoriales en los resultados de la atención sanitaria (mortalidad) y la inversión (gasto de la atención sanitaria) en el sistema de la Seguridad Social en España. Basándonos en un modelo empírico para el gasto de la salud en las comunidades autónomas y según una batería de indicadores de desigualdades (algunos extraídos de estudios previos, y otros de cálculos nuevos), obtenemos los siguientes resultados. Primero, la transferencia de la competencia de atención sanitaria no ha llevado a una expansión de las desigualdades regionales en los resultados y las inversiones. Segundo, no hay pruebas claras de que la transferencia de competencias aumente el gasto de la salud pública (en términos reales) en los estados regionales con las competencias transferidas con la excepción de una contabilidad fiscalmente responsable. Para terminar, el gasto de la salud en las comunidades autónomas se explica por las diferencias en las necesidades y una mayor dependencia de la atención sanitaria, los efectos del tamaño así como la dimensión económica y demográfica de la región en cuestión, además de los ingresos regionales. Desigualdades regionales Interacciones políticas Responsabilidad política Seguridad Social

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Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Regional Studies.

Volume (Year): 40 (2006)
Issue (Month): 8 (November)
Pages: 875-887
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Handle: RePEc:taf:regstd:v:40:y:2006:i:8:p:875-887

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Related research
Keywords: Regional inequalities; Political interactions; Political accountability; Spanish National Health System (NHS);

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Guillem López & Joan Costa-Font & Ivan Planas, 2004. "Diversity and Regional Inequalities: Assessing the Outcomes of the Spanish 'System of Health Care Services'," Economics Working Papers 745, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Revelli, Federico, 2001. "Spatial Patterns in Local Taxation: Tax Mimicking or Error Mimicking?," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 33(9), pages 1101-07, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1987. "The economics of the local public sector," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 11, pages 571-645 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Revelli, Federico, 2002. "Testing the Tax Mimicking versus Expenditure Spill-Over Hypotheses Using English Data," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 34(14), pages 1723-31, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kneebone, Ronald D, 1992. "Centralization and the Size of Government in Canada," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 24(12), pages 1293-1300, December.
  7. Joan Costa-Font & Ana Rico, 2006. "Vertical Competition in the Spanish National Health System (NHS)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 477-498, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Salmon, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 24-43, Summer.
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  9. Joan Costa & Jaume Garcia, 2003. "Demand for private health insurance: how important is the quality gap?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(7), pages 587-599. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Joan Costa-Font & Jordi Pons-Novell, 2007. "Public health expenditure and spatial interactions in a decentralized national health system," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(3), pages 291-306. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Giardina, Emilio & Cavalieri, Marina & Guccio, Calogero & Mazza, Isidoro, 2009. "Federalism, Party Competition and Budget Outcome: Empirical Findings on Regional Health Expenditure in Italy," MPRA Paper 16437, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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