Economics of devolution/decentralization in the UK: Some questions and answers
Abstract
McGregor P. G. and Swales K. (2005) Economics of devolution/decentralization in the UK: some questions and answers, Regional Studies 39 , 477-494. The paper explores the economic implications of the radical process of devolution, decentralization and delegation of decision-making and policy delivery initiated by the post-1997 UK Labour Government. It is argued that the economies of all the presently devolved regions ultimately suffer if the Barnett Formula is rigorously imposed. It is shown that the efficiency of devolving fiscal authority involves a balance of positive and negative elements (depending on wage bargaining and migration responses). It is then argued that delegation/devolution of regional economic development policies, while exploiting regional information advantages, neglects regional economic interdependence, so there are potential gains from greater cooperation/coordination.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Regional Studies.
Volume (Year): 39 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 477-494
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Web page: http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/link.asp?target=journal&id=104661
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Related research
Keywords: Economics of devolution; Decentralization; Fiscal federalism; Barnett Formula; Tartan tax; Regional economic development; Economie de la decentralisation; Decentralisation; Federalisme fiscal; Formule Barnett; Taxe ecossaise; Amenagement du territoire; Wirtschaftliche Seite der Machtubertragung; Dezentralisation; Finanzfoderalismus; Barnettsche Formel; Tartan tax; Regionalwirtschaftliche Entwicklung; Implicaciones economicas de la descentralizacion; Delegacion de poderes; Federalismo fiscal; Formula de Barnett; Impuesto Tartan; Desarrollo economico regional; JEL classifications: H1; H7; R1; R5;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- JEL - Labor and Demographic Economics - - - - -
- cla - - - - - -
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
- R1 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics
- R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Libman, Alexander, 2009. "Essays on Asymmetric Federalism," MPRA Paper 21591, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kristinn Hermannsson & Katerina Lisenkova & Peter G McGregor & J Kim Swales, 2011. "Regional Impact Analyses and the Appropriate Treatment of Regional Budget Constraints under Devolution: An Application to the Impact of Scottish HEIs," ERSA conference papers ersa10p1595, European Regional Science Association.
- Ronald MacDonald & Paul Hallwood, 2004. "The Economic Case for Fiscal Federalism in Scotland," Working papers 2004-42, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
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