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Resourcing Conservative Transition in Vietnam: Rent Switching and Resource Appropriation

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  • Adam Fforde

Abstract

This article applies a novel approach to analysis of the transition to the market economy in Vietnam, a country with a political economy that draws upon South-East Asian, Sinic and Leninist cultural elements. This was a 'conservative' transition, in the sense that no shift in political regime occurred. Understanding transition as a process where endogenous forces drive and resource institutional change, and far from dependent upon policy shifts, the article argues that it relied heavily upon two sets of phenomena. The first may be understood in terms of the creation and seeking out of economic rents, in the 'neoclassical' sense of resources available 'below economic costs'. When rents result from institutional obstacles to competition, institutional change can support relatively costless output gains. I argue for Vietnam that as the economic system switched from plan to market, so rent seeking shifted away from advantageous access to resources for plan implementation, to switching resources into forms that supported market-oriented activity. This 'rent switching' (RS) relied upon adaptive social relations, comparable to the 'competitive clientelism' of the SEA studies literature, that were preserved and augmented during transition. It also permitted mobilisation of resources derived from static efficiency gains. This framework contrasts with a second, more 'classical' in nature, that concentrates upon the creation of appropriable resources (ARs) and contestation over them. These help explain the medium and longer term, and how ways of appropriating resources supported the political economy of systemic change. At root, this is then to do with the emergence of factor markets (land, labour and capital), class formation and thus broader social and cultural change. The article thus argues that different economic theories provide useful insights into the social as well as the economic implications and nature of the transition to a market economy. Given that static efficiency gains, whilst significant in relative impact, tend to act over the short term, and, since growth processes take decades, the 'neoclassical' approach is ultimately less important than the 'classical' one.

Suggested Citation

  • Adam Fforde, 2002. "Resourcing Conservative Transition in Vietnam: Rent Switching and Resource Appropriation," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(2), pages 203-226.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:pocoec:v:14:y:2002:i:2:p:203-226
    DOI: 10.1080/14631370220139927
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 1999. "Interfirm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(4), pages 1285-1320.
    2. Kokko, Ari, 1998. "Vietnam - Ready for Doi Moi II?," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 286, Stockholm School of Economics.
    3. Ericson, Richard E., 1984. "The "second economy" and resource allocation under central planning," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 1-24, March.
    4. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    5. McMillan, John, 1994. "Policy Paper 11: China’s Nonconformist Reforms," Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Working Paper Series qt9cn9b13c, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mai, Nhat Chi, 2018. "Valuing Social Capital: Shifting Strategies for Export Success of Vietnamese Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises," OSF Preprints rxjav, Center for Open Science.
    2. Adam Fforde, 2017. "The emerging core characteristics of Vietnam's political economy," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 31(2), pages 45-60, November.
    3. Sultan, Tursinbek & Wolz, Axel, 2012. "Agricultural Cooperative Development in China and Vietnam since Decollectivization: A Multi-Stakeholder Approach," Journal of Rural Cooperation, Hebrew University, Center for Agricultural Economic Research, vol. 40(2), pages 1-21.

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