IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/marpmg/v42y2015i1p11-25.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities to maximize traffic volumes

Author

Listed:
  • Hsiao-Chi Chen
  • Shi-Miin Liu

Abstract

This article analyzes optimal concession contracts offered by a landlord port authority to competing operators of container terminals. The port authority pursues traffic-volume maximization. Three contract schemes considered are fixed-fee, unit-fee, and two-part tariff. A two-stage game is constructed to characterize interactions between the port authority and two terminal operators. We discover that the fixed-fee contract is the best choice for the authority. Terminal operators' congestion costs and competition modes have no impact on this contract choice. Our results demonstrate that port authority's goal is an important factor in determining optimal concession contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu, 2015. "Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities to maximize traffic volumes," Maritime Policy & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(1), pages 11-25, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:marpmg:v:42:y:2015:i:1:p:11-25
    DOI: 10.1080/03088839.2013.863435
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03088839.2013.863435
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/03088839.2013.863435?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Morton I. Kamien & Yair Tauman, 1986. "Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(3), pages 471-491.
    2. Can Erutku & Yves Richelle, 2007. "Optimal Licensing Contracts and the Value of a Patent," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 407-436, June.
    3. Carlos Oliveira Cruz & Rui Cunha Marques, 2012. "Risk-Sharing in Seaport Terminal Concessions," Transport Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(4), pages 455-471, February.
    4. Claudio Ferrari & Manuela Basta, 2009. "Port concession fees based on the price-cap regulation: A DEA approach," Maritime Economics & Logistics, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association of Maritime Economists (IAME), vol. 11(1), pages 121-135, March.
    5. Naima Saeed & Odd I Larsen, 2010. "Container terminal concessions: A game theory application to the case of the ports of Pakistan," Maritime Economics & Logistics, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association of Maritime Economists (IAME), vol. 12(3), pages 237-262, September.
    6. Rui Cunha Marques & Álvaro Fonseca, 2010. "Market structure, privatisation and regulation of Portuguese seaports," Maritime Policy & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(2), pages 145-161, March.
    7. Kamien, Morton I. & Oren, Shmuel S. & Tauman, Yair, 1992. "Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 483-508.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Qiang & Zheng, Shiyuan & Geerlings, Harry & El Makhloufi, Abdel, 2019. "Port governance revisited: How to govern and for what purpose?," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 46-57.
    2. Zheng, Shiyuan & Ge, Ying-En & Fu, Xiaowen & Nie, Yu (Marco) & Xie, Chi, 2017. "Modeling collusion-proof port emission regulation of cargo-handling activities under incomplete information," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 543-567.
    3. Zheng, Shiyuan & Ge, Ying-En & Fu, Xiaowen & (Marco) Nie, Yu & Xie, Chi, 2020. "Demand information sharing in port concession arrangements," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 118-143.
    4. Han, Wenqing & Liu, Shi-Miin & Chen, Hsiao-Chi, 2020. "Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities under incomplete information," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 113-127.
    5. Zhang, Jihua, 2016. "Quasi-landlord port financing in China: Features, practice and a contract theory analysis," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 73-88.
    6. Liu, Shi-Miin & Chen, Hsiao-Chi & Han, Wenqing & Lin, Yen-Hung, 2018. "Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities to maximize fee revenues with minimal throughput requirements," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 239-260.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Liu, Shi-Miin & Chen, Hsiao-Chi & Han, Wenqing & Lin, Yen-Hung, 2018. "Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities to maximize fee revenues with minimal throughput requirements," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 239-260.
    2. Sen, Debapriya & Tauman, Yair, 2018. "Patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly: General results," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 37-48.
    3. Marta San Martín & Ana I. Saracho, 2015. "Optimal Two-part Tariff Licensing Mechanisms," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(3), pages 288-306, June.
    4. Toker Doganoglu & Firat Inceoglu, 2014. "Licensing of a Drastic Innovation with Product Differentiation," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(3), pages 296-321, June.
    5. Debapriya Sen & Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2009. "Technology Transfer Under Returns To Scale," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(3), pages 337-365, June.
    6. Luca Sandrini, 2023. "Price vs Market Share with Royalty Licensing: Incomplete Adoption of a Superior Technology with Heterogeneous Firms," Discussion Papers 2302, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Quantitative Social and Management Sciences.
    7. Xue, Minggao & Su, Lili, 2011. "Licensing to a durable-good duopoly in patent litigation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 1186-1194, May.
    8. Chen, Jingxian & Liang, Liang & Yao, Dong-qing, 2017. "An analysis of intellectual property licensing strategy under duopoly competition: Component or product-based?," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 502-513.
    9. Meniere, Yann & Parlane, Sarah, 2010. "Decentralized licensing of complementary patents: Comparing the royalty, fixed-fee and two-part tariff regimes," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 178-191, May.
    10. C. Erutku & A. Priegue Freire & Y. Richelle, 2007. "Licensing Innovations with Exclusive Contracts," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 31(4), pages 261-273, December.
    11. Zheng, Shiyuan & Ge, Ying-En & Fu, Xiaowen & (Marco) Nie, Yu & Xie, Chi, 2020. "Demand information sharing in port concession arrangements," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 118-143.
    12. Kishimoto, Shin & Watanabe, Naoki & Muto, Shigeo, 2011. "Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: Asymptotic results in a general Cournot market," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 114-123, March.
    13. Arijit Mukherjee, 2014. "Licensing under convex costs," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(3), pages 289-299, April.
    14. Cheng-Tai Wu & Cheng-Hau Peng & Tsung-Sheng Tsai, 2021. "Signaling in Technology Licensing with a Downstream Oligopoly," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(4), pages 531-559, June.
    15. Han, Wenqing & Liu, Shi-Miin & Chen, Hsiao-Chi, 2020. "Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities under incomplete information," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 113-127.
    16. Zhang, Jihua, 2016. "Quasi-landlord port financing in China: Features, practice and a contract theory analysis," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 73-88.
    17. Yan, Yan & Li, Yi, 2023. "Regulation, external R&D, and strategic diffusion of pollution abatement technology," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 731-744.
    18. Ramón Faulí-Oller & Joel Sandonís, 2003. "Merging To License: Internal Vs. External Patentee," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-17, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    19. José Martins & Rui Cunha Marques & Carlos Oliveira Cruz & Álvaro Fonseca, 2017. "Flexibility in planning and development of a container terminal: an application of an American-style call option," Transportation Planning and Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(7), pages 828-840, October.
    20. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2008:i:5:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Sen, Debapriya & Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, 2016. "Licensing under general demand and cost functions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 253(3), pages 673-680.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:marpmg:v:42:y:2015:i:1:p:11-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/TMPM20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.