This paper studies the role of copyright in the market for cultural output and how parallel imports effect the structure of incentives faced by artists. It demonstrates that parallel imports effect the distribution of income between generations of artists, raising the income of younger artists while reducing the income of superstars; the net outcome being a decline in the number of artists producing cultural output. Optimal subsidies to offset this decline can either involve a subsidy to starving young artists and no subsidy for superstars, or the opposite outcome depending on government attitudes towards the distribution of income.
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