Parallel Imports and Price Controls
AbstractPrice controls create opportunities for international arbitrage. Many have argued that such arbitrage, if tolerated, will undermine intellectual property rights and dull the incentives for investment in research-intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals. We challenge this orthodox view and show, to the contrary, that the pace of innovation often is faster in a world with international exhaustion of intellectual property rights than in one with national exhaustion. The key to our conclusion is to recognize that governments will make different choices of price controls when parallel imports are allowed by their trade partners than they will when they are not.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5779.
Date of creation: Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Other versions of this item:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, 2004.
"International Protection of Intellectual Property,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1635-1653, December.
- Gene Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, 2002. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," NBER Working Papers 8704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, 2002. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," CESifo Working Paper Series 790, CESifo Group Munich.
- Grossman, Gene & Lai, Edwin, 2002. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," CEPR Discussion Papers 3118, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gene M Grossman & Edwin L Lai, 2004. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000442, David K. Levine.
- Grossman, G.M. & Lai, E., 2001. "International Protection of intellectual Property," Papers 215, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Malueg, D.A. & Schwartz, M., 1993.
"Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion and International Price Discrimination,"
93-6, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
- Malueg, David A. & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Parallel imports, demand dispersion, and international price discrimination," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3-4), pages 167-195, November.
- Li, Changying & Maskus, Keith E., 2006. "The impact of parallel imports on investments in cost-reducing research and development," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 443-455, March.
- Stefan Szymanski & Tommaso Valletti, 2005. "Parallel trade, price discrimination, investment and price caps," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 20(44), pages 705-749, October.
- Keith E. Maskus, 2000. "Parallel Imports," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(9), pages 1269-1284, 09.
- Keith E. Maskus, 2000. "Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 99.
- Ganslandt, Mattias & Maskus, Keith E., 2001.
"Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Products in the European Union,"
Working Paper Series
546, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Ganslandt, Mattias & Maskus, Keith E., 2001. "Parallel imports of pharmaceutical products in the European Union," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2630, The World Bank.
- Valletti, Tommaso M., 2006. "Differential pricing, parallel trade, and the incentive to invest," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 314-324, September.
- Keith E. Maskus, 1993. "Intellectual property rights and the Uruguay Round," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q I, pages 10-25.
- Danzon, Patricia M. & Towse, Adrian, 2003. "Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D and Patents," Working paper 258, Regulation2point0.
- Patricia M. Danzon, 1998. "The Economics of Parallel Trade," PharmacoEconomics, Springer Healthcare | Adis, vol. 13(3), pages 293-304.
- J. S. Chard & C. J. Mellor, 1989. "Intellectual Property Rights and Parallel Imports," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 69-84, 03.
- Pecorino, Paul, 2002. "Should the US allow prescription drug reimports from Canada?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 699-708, July.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.