The mark-to-market valuation and executive pay package regulations within the 2009 US (Bailout) Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
Abstract
The paper shows that the effect of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) is ambiguous. It discusses the benefits and costs of mark-to-market valuation and design of executive pay package policies within the US 2009 EESA. It highlights how the mark-to-market valuation standard influenced financial institutions, explains why mark-to-market policy suspension proponents can support the EESA, and realizes how the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) can count on the EESA while assessing the need and cost of the mark-to-market policy. Also, the paper discusses the promise of executive wage caps within the EESA. Moreover, it differentiates between executive pay packages pre- and post-EESA policies.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Journal of Economic Policy Reform.
Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 189-199
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Related research
Keywords: corporate governance; financial crisis; bailout; EESA; mark-to-market valuation; executive pay package caps;Other versions of this item:
- Jamal Ibrahim Haidar, 2009. "The mark-to-market valuation and executive pay package regulations within the 2009 US (Bailout) Emergency Economic Stabilization Act," Journal of Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 189-199.
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Carlos D. Ramirez, 2011. "The $700 Billion Bailout: A Public-Choice Interpretation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 13.
- Michele Fratianni & Francesco Marchionne, 2010. "Banks’ Great Bailout of 2008-2009," Working Papers 2010-03, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Jakob Bosma, 2011. "Communicating Bailout Policy and Risk Taking in the Banking Industry," DNB Working Papers 277, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Cicero I. LIMBEREA, 2009. "A Quantification Of The 2008-2009 US Bailout Package," Review of Economic and Business Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, issue 3, pages 127-135, May.
- Michele Fratianni & Francesco Marchionne, 2010. "The Banking Bailout of the Subprime Crisis: Size and Effects," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 63(254), pages 187-233.
- Jamal Ibrahim Haidar, 2012. "Sovereign Credit Risk in the Eurozone," World Economics, World Economics, Economic & Financial Publishing, PO Box 69, Henley-on-Thames, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom, RG9 1GB, vol. 13(1), pages 123-136, January.
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