Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The mark-to-market valuation and executive pay package regulations within the 2009 US (Bailout) Emergency Economic Stabilization Act

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jamal Ibrahim Haidar
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The paper shows that the effect of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) is ambiguous. It discusses the benefits and costs of mark-to-market valuation and design of executive pay package policies within the US 2009 EESA. It highlights how the mark-to-market valuation standard influenced financial institutions, explains why mark-to-market policy suspension proponents can support the EESA, and realizes how the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) can count on the EESA while assessing the need and cost of the mark-to-market policy. Also, the paper discusses the promise of executive wage caps within the EESA. Moreover, it differentiates between executive pay packages pre- and post-EESA policies.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&doi=10.1080/17487870903105361&magic=repec&7C&7C8674ECAB8BB840C6AD35DC6213A474B5
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Journal of Economic Policy Reform.

    Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 189-199

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:taf:jecprf:v:12:y:2009:i:3:p:189-199

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/GPRE20

    Order Information:
    Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GPRE20

    Related research

    Keywords: corporate governance; financial crisis; bailout; EESA; mark-to-market valuation; executive pay package caps;

    Other versions of this item:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Michele Fratianni & Francesco Marchionne, 2010. "Banks’ Great Bailout of 2008-2009," Working Papers 2010-03, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    2. Jakob Bosma, 2011. "Communicating Bailout Policy and Risk Taking in the Banking Industry," DNB Working Papers 277, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    3. Jamal Ibrahim Haidar, 2012. "Sovereign Credit Risk in the Eurozone," World Economics, World Economics, Economic & Financial Publishing, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 13(1), pages 123-136, January.
    4. Cicero I. LIMBEREA, 2009. "A Quantification Of The 2008-2009 US Bailout Package," Review of Economic and Business Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, issue 3, pages 127-135, May.
    5. Ramirez Carlos D., 2011. "The $700 Billion Bailout: A Public-Choice Interpretation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 291-318, November.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:jecprf:v:12:y:2009:i:3:p:189-199. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.