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The Effect Of Opportunity Cost And Hawkishness On Protests In Occupied Regions

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  • Rupayan Gupta

Abstract

This paper examines how the opportunity costs of the leader of a national protest movement and the intrinsic hawkishness or pacifism of the occupier affect the nature of the movement against occupation. The characteristics of the population residing in the occupied region, the nature of punishment that is being meted out to the protestors, and the structure of enforcement costs that lead to these outcomes are discussed in the paper.

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  • Rupayan Gupta, 2012. "The Effect Of Opportunity Cost And Hawkishness On Protests In Occupied Regions," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 17-49, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:23:y:2012:i:1:p:17-49
    DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2010.540820
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