Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?
AbstractThis article identifies a potential adverse effect of antitrust enforcement. We show that if tacit collusion is not sustainable, firms are able and willing to collude explicitly when demand is viscous, the expected antitrust penalty is limited and antitrust agencies are sufficiently effective in catching cartels.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 20 (2013)
Issue (Month): 6 (April)
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Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAEL20
Other versions of this item:
- Bos Iwan & Peeters Ronald & Pot Erik, 2010. "Do Antitrust Agencies Facilitate Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms?," Research Memoranda 030, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
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