IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/apeclt/v11y2004i10p651-656.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Recalls and unemployment insurance taxes

Author

Listed:
  • S. Jurajda

Abstract

The US unemployment insurance (UI) system draws its funds from a payroll tax on employers. The tax rate varies directly with an employer's layoff history. There exists extensive evidence on the effect of this so-called experience rated tax on layoff decisions. However, since firms are typically liable for each dollar of regular UI benefits paid to laid off former employees, experience rating may also affect recall behaviour. This note therefore measures the effect of the UI financing system on the duration of unemployment. This article finds some evidence that higher layoff tax costs shorten the duration of recall unemployment.

Suggested Citation

  • S. Jurajda, 2004. "Recalls and unemployment insurance taxes," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(10), pages 651-656.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:11:y:2004:i:10:p:651-656
    DOI: 10.1080/1350485042000238861
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&doi=10.1080/1350485042000238861&magic=repec&7C&7C8674ECAB8BB840C6AD35DC6213A474B5
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/1350485042000238861?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Card, David & Levine, Phillip B., 1994. "Unemployment insurance taxes and the cyclical and seasonal properties of unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-29, January.
    2. Jurajda, Stepan, 2002. "Estimating the effect of unemployment insurance compensation on the labor market histories of displaced workers," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 227-252, June.
    3. Lawrence F. Katz & Bruce D. Meyer, 1990. "Unemployment Insurance, Recall Expectations, and Unemployment Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(4), pages 973-1002.
    4. Feldstein, Martin S, 1976. "Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 937-957, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Vikström, Johan, 2009. "The effect of employer incentives in social insurance on individual wages," Working Paper Series 2009:13, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    2. Alfonso Alba & Jose Maria Arranz & Fernando Muñoz-Bullón, 2012. "Re-employment probabilities of unemployment benefit recipients," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(28), pages 3645-3664, October.
    3. Melanie Arntz & Ralf Wilke, 2009. "Can public employment subsidies render the German construction sector weather proof?," Discussion Papers 09/06, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
    4. Liebig, Stefan & Hense, Andrea, 2007. "Bedingungen und Folgen betriebsbedingter Entlassungen mit anschließender Wiederbeschäftigung in Deutschland," Duisburger Beiträge zur soziologischen Forschung 4/2007, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of Sociology.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rafael Lalive & Josef Zweim�ller, "undated". "Benefit Entitlement and the Labor Market: Evidence from a Large-Scale Policy Change," IEW - Working Papers 105, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Albertini, Julien & Fairise, Xavier & Terriau, Anthony, 2023. "Unemployment insurance, recalls, and experience rating," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    3. Melanie Arntz & Ralf Wilke, 2009. "Can public employment subsidies render the German construction sector weather proof?," Discussion Papers 09/06, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
    4. Jurajda, Stepan, 2002. "Estimating the effect of unemployment insurance compensation on the labor market histories of displaced workers," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 227-252, June.
    5. José María Arranz & Carlos García Serrano, 2015. "Los sistemas de prestaciones por desempleo de “experience rating”. Un análisis de los despidos temporales y los subsidios cruzados en España," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 212(1), pages 129-168, March.
    6. Krueger, Alan B. & Meyer, Bruce D., 2002. "Labor supply effects of social insurance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 33, pages 2327-2392, Elsevier.
    7. Rebollo-Sanz, Yolanda, 2012. "Unemployment insurance and job turnover in Spain," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 403-426.
    8. Stepan Jurajda, 2001. "In ow into Unemployment: Employment Spells and Unemployment Insurance," Labor and Demography 0012008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Bernardus Van Doornik & David Schoenherr & Janis Skrastins, 2018. "Unemployment Insurance, Strategic Unemployment and Firm-Worker Collusion," Working Papers Series 483, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    10. Gutierrez, Italo A., 2016. "Job insecurity, unemployment insurance and on-the-job search. Evidence from older American workers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 228-245.
    11. Bruce D. Meyer & Dan T. Rosenbaum, "undated". "Repeat Use of Unemployment Insurance," IPR working papers 95-24, Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University.
    12. Albanese, Andrea & Picchio, Matteo & Ghirelli, Corinna, 2020. "Timed to Say Goodbye: Does Unemployment Benefit Eligibility Affect Worker Layoffs?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    13. L'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck, 2009. "Employment protection reform in search economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 255-273, April.
    14. Stepan Jurajda, 1999. "Unemployment Outflow and Unemployment Insurance Taxes," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp143, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    15. Konstantinos Tatsiramos, 2009. "Unemployment Insurance in Europe: Unemployment Duration and Subsequent Employment Stability," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(6), pages 1225-1260, December.
    16. Julien Albertini & Xavier Fairise, 2018. "Layoffs, recalls and experience rating," Working Papers halshs-01879560, HAL.
    17. Lepage-Saucier, Nicolas, 2016. "The consumption response to temporary layoffs and hours losses," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 177-193.
    18. Martin Feldstein & Daniel Altman, 2007. "Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 21, pages 35-64, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Marco Di Maggio & Amir Kermani, 2016. "The Importance of Unemployment Insurance as an Automatic Stabilizer," NBER Working Papers 22625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Zweimüller, Josef, 2018. "Unemployment insurance and the labor market," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 1-14.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:11:y:2004:i:10:p:651-656. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAEL20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.