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Unemployment insurance and job turnover in Spain

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  • Rebollo-Sanz, Yolanda

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the potential relationships between the unemployment insurance system and labour market turnover. This study assumes the incentives embedded in the unemployment insurance system have a heterogeneous impact, depending on the type of labour market transition (quits versus layoffs and recalls versus new job entrances) and on a worker's attachment to the labour market (gender and type of contract). The layoff hazard rate increases as workers qualify for unemployment benefits, whilst the quit hazard rate remains stable. Similarly, employment inflow increases sharply after the exhaustion of unemployment benefits. The timing and importance of the exit differ between recalls and new job entry and depend on a worker's attachment to the labour market. The results show that unemployment benefits appear to favour job turnover and both firms' and workers' decisions seem to matter.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Labour Economics.

Volume (Year): 19 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 403-426

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Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:19:y:2012:i:3:p:403-426

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/labeco

Related research

Keywords: Unemployment insurance; Job turnover; Multivariate mix proportional hazard models; Recall and layoffs; Temporary dismissals;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Simoes, Nadia, 2013. "Subsídio de desemprego: uma revisão da literatura teórica e empírica
    [Unemployment insurance: a survey]
    ," MPRA Paper 52332, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Raquel Carrasco & J. Ignacio García Pérez, 2012. "Economic Conditions and Employment Dynamics of Immigrants versus Natives: Who Pays the Costs of the "Great Recession"?," Economics Working Papers we1232, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  3. Tatsiramos, Konstantinos & van Ours, Jan C., 2012. "Labor Market Effects of Unemployment Insurance Design," IZA Discussion Papers 6950, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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