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Schuldenbremse — Investitionshemmnis oder Vorbild für Europa?
[Debt Brake — Investment Barrier or Role Model for Europe?]

Author

Listed:
  • Clemens Fuest

    (ifo Institut)

  • Klaus Gründler

    (ifo Institut)

  • Niklas Potrafke

    (ifo Institut)

  • Marcel Fratzscher

    (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung)

  • Alexander Kriwoluzky

    (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung)

  • Claus Michelsen

    (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung)

  • Michael Hüther

    (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln e.V.)

  • Peter Bofinger

    (Universität Würzburg)

  • Lars P. Feld

    (Walter Eucken Institut)

  • Wolf Heinrich Reuter

    (c/o Statistisches Bundesamt)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Auf dem Höhepunkt der Finanzkrise vor zehn Jahren wurde die Schuldenbremse eingeführt. Seither haben sich die öffentlichen Haushalte deutlich erholt — wohl überwiegend nicht aufgrund der Schuldenbremse. Vielmehr haben der lang anhaltende Aufschwung und dauerhaft niedrige Zinsen zu einem Rückgang der Defizit- und Schuldenquote geführt. Heute steht die Schuldenbremse wieder in der Kritik: Die Defizitgrenze reduziere die Staatsverschuldung auf einen zu niedrigen Wert. Eine niedrige Verschuldungsquote wäre nicht sinnvoll, wenn der Zins für Staatsanleihen langfristig unter der Wachstumrate des nominalen Bruttoinlandsprodukts liegt. Zudem würde eine höhere Verschuldung das Angebot an sicheren öffentlichen Schuldtiteln und damit das Finanzsystem stabilisieren. Außerdem wird befürchtet, dass die Begrenzung des Defizits Anreize für Politiker setzt, weniger in langfristige Projekte zu investieren. Nicht zuletzt beschneide die Schuldenbremse die Möglichkeit, bei einem konjunkturellen Abschwung zu reagieren. Relativ einfach ließe sich die Kritik auffangen, wenn strukturelle Neuverschuldung in Höhe der Investitionen zugelassen würde (goldene Regel).

Suggested Citation

  • Clemens Fuest & Klaus Gründler & Niklas Potrafke & Marcel Fratzscher & Alexander Kriwoluzky & Claus Michelsen & Michael Hüther & Peter Bofinger & Lars P. Feld & Wolf Heinrich Reuter, 2019. "Schuldenbremse — Investitionshemmnis oder Vorbild für Europa? [Debt Brake — Investment Barrier or Role Model for Europe?]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 99(5), pages 307-329, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:99:y:2019:i:5:d:10.1007_s10273-019-2451-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10273-019-2451-7
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    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Blum & Klaus Gründler & Raphael de Britto Schiller & Niklas Potrafke, 2019. "Die Schuldenbremse in der Diskussion – Teilnehmer des Ökonomenpanels mehrheitlich für Beibehaltung," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 72(22), pages 27-33, November.
    2. Mathias Hoffmann & Iryna Stewen & Michael Stiefel, 2021. "Growing Like Germany: Local Public Debt, Local Banks, Low Private Investment," Working Papers 2103, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing

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