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De Facto Versus de Jure Political Institutions in the Long-Run: A Multivariate Analysis, 1820–2000

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  • Peter Foldvari

    (International Institute of Social History
    Utrecht University)

Abstract

In this paper we use the components of the PolityIV project’s polity2 and Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy indicators to analyse the relationship between de jure and de facto political institutions from 1820 until 2000 with a canonical correlation method corrected for the sample selection bias. We find considerable fluctuation in the relationship between the two measures. After a moderate positive correlation found during the first half of the nineteenth century, the two measures become statistically unrelated until the 1940s. The relationship becomes strong and positive only in the second half of the twentieth century. The relationship between de jure and de facto political institutions hence can be described as a U-curve, reminiscent to an inverse Kuznets-curve.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Foldvari, 2017. "De Facto Versus de Jure Political Institutions in the Long-Run: A Multivariate Analysis, 1820–2000," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 130(2), pages 759-777, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:soinre:v:130:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11205-015-1204-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s11205-015-1204-2
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democratization; De facto and de jure institutions; Canonical correlation; Polity IV; Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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