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Single-crossing choice correspondences

Author

Listed:
  • Matheus Costa

    (University of Brasília)

  • Paulo Henrique Ramos

    (University of Chicago)

  • Gil Riella

    (FGV EPPG Escola de Políticas Públicas e Governo
    Getulio Vargas Foundation)

Abstract

We characterize choice correspondences that can be justified by a collection of preferences that satisfy the single-crossing and/or single-peak properties. These are properties vastly used in the applied literature, often in the context of parametric families of objective (utility) functions that satisfy them. Apesteguia et al. (Econometrica 85(2):661–674, 2017) characterize random utility models that satisfy those properties, and we provide similar results in the context of choice correspondences that admit a pseudo-rational or justifiable choice representation. These results might be useful for researchers in situations where it is not possible to work with random utility models or parametric families of objective (utility) functions. In addition, we use them to discuss some aspects of the connection between deterministic and stochastic choice.

Suggested Citation

  • Matheus Costa & Paulo Henrique Ramos & Gil Riella, 2020. "Single-crossing choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 69-86, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:54:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-019-01212-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01212-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. De Donder, Philippe, 2013. "Majority voting and the single-crossing property when voters belong to separate groups," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 523-525.
    2. Jose Apesteguia & Miguel A. Ballester & Jay Lu, 2017. "Single‐Crossing Random Utility Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 661-674, March.
    3. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
    4. Alejandro Saporiti & Fernando Tohmé, 2006. "Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 363-383, April.
    5. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-180, January.
    6. Berry, Steven & Levinsohn, James & Pakes, Ariel, 1995. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 841-890, July.
    7. Heller, Yuval, 2012. "Justifiable choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 375-390.
    8. Martin, Mathieu & Merlin, Vincent, 2002. "The stability set as a social choice correspondence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 91-113, September.
    9. Robert Bredereck & Jiehua Chen & Gerhard Woeginger, 2013. "A characterization of the single-crossing domain," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 989-998, October.
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