In standard political economy models, voters are ‘self-interested’ i.e. care only about ‘own’ utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often have ‘other-regarding preferences’ (ORP), i.e., in deciding among alternative policies voters care about their payoffs relative to others. We extend a widely used general equilibrium framework in political economy to allow for voters with ORP, as in Fehr- Schmidt (1999). In line with the evidence, these preferences allow voters to exhibit ‘envy’ and ‘altruism’, in addition to the standard concern for ‘own utility’. We give sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have ORP. This could open the way for an incorporation of ORP in a variety of political economy models. Furthermore, as a corollary, we give more general conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have purely selfish preferences.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number
07/16.
Length: Date of creation: Nov 2007 Date of revision:
Jun 2008 Handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:07/16
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics University of Leicester, University Road. Leicester. LE1 7RH. UK Phone: +44 (0)116 252 2887 Fax: +44 (0)116 252 2908 Email: Web page: http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/
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