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The value of a player in n-person games

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Author Info
Matthias Mohr () (Deutsche Bundesbank, Economics Department, Wilhelm-Epstein-Strasse 14-16, P.O. Box 100602, D-60006 Frankfurt am Main, Germany)
Kjell Hausken () (School of Economics, Culture and Social Sciences, University of Stavanger, P.O. Box 2557 Ullandhaug, N-4091 Stavanger, Norway)

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Abstract

The article decomposes the Shapley value into a value matrix which gives the value of every player to every other player in n-person games. Element ij(v) in the value matrix is positive, zero, or negative, dependent on whether row player i is beneficial, has no impact, or is not beneficial for column player j. The elements in each row and in each column of the value matrix sum up to the Shapley value of the respective player. The value matrix is illustrated by the voting procedure in the European Council of Ministers 1981-1995.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 18 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 465-483
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:3:p:465-483

Note: Received: 9 September 1998/Accepted: 11 February 2000
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  1. Julien Reynaud & Fabien Lange & Lukasz Gatarek & Christian Thimann, 2007. "Proximity in coalition building," Working Paper Series 0808, Budapest Tech, Keleti Faculty of Economics, revised Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Sutter, 2006. "An experimental analysis of voting in the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Monetary Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 417-434, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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