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Public commitment strategies in intergovernmental negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty

Author

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  • Hartmut Lenz
  • Han Dorussen
  • Hugh Ward

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Hartmut Lenz & Han Dorussen & Hugh Ward, 2007. "Public commitment strategies in intergovernmental negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 131-152, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:2:y:2007:i:2:p:131-152
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-007-9017-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 427-460, July.
    2. Schultz, Kenneth A., 1999. "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(2), pages 233-266, April.
    3. Jongryn Mo, 1994. "The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(3), pages 402-422, September.
    4. Ahmer Tarar, 2005. "Constituencies and Preferences in International Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(3), pages 383-407, June.
    5. Smith, Alastair, 1998. "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(3), pages 623-638, September.
    6. Ahmer Tarar, 2001. "International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(3), pages 320-340, June.
    7. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
    8. Mo, Jongryn, 1995. "Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 914-924, December.
    9. Powell, Robert, 2004. "The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 231-241, May.
    10. Schneider, Gerald & Cederman, Lars-Erik, 1994. "The change of tide in political cooperation: a limited information model of European integration," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(4), pages 633-662, October.
    11. Fearon, James D., 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 577-592, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alexandra Hennessy, 2017. "Good Samaritans vs. Hardliners: the Role of Credible Signalling in Greek Bailout Negotiations," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 744-761, July.
    2. Simon Hug & Thomas König, 2007. "Domestic structures and constitution-building in an international organization: Introduction," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 105-113, June.
    3. Achim Kemmerling, 2008. "When `No' Means `Yes, But'," Rationality and Society, , vol. 20(3), pages 283-309, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Union; Constitutional treaty; Public commitment; Signaling games; Domestic constraints; C02; C31; C72; C78; D72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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