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Good Samaritans vs. Hardliners: the Role of Credible Signalling in Greek Bailout Negotiations

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  • Alexandra Hennessy

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  • Alexandra Hennessy, 2017. "Good Samaritans vs. Hardliners: the Role of Credible Signalling in Greek Bailout Negotiations," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 744-761, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:55:y:2017:i:4:p:744-761
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hartmut Lenz & Han Dorussen & Hugh Ward, 2007. "Public commitment strategies in intergovernmental negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 131-152, June.
    2. Kevin Featherstone, 2016. "Conditionality, Democracy and Institutional Weakness: the Euro-crisis Trilemma," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54, pages 48-64, September.
    3. Stone, Randall W., 2004. "The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 577-591, November.
    4. Kydd, Andrew, 2000. "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 325-357, April.
    5. Featherstone, Kevin, 2016. "Conditionality, democracy and institutional weakness: the Euro-crisis trilemma," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66310, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Spyros Skouras & Nicos Christodoulakis, 2014. "Electoral misgovernance cycles: evidence from wildfires and tax evasion in Greece," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 533-559, June.
    7. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    8. C. Fred Bergsten & Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, 2012. "The Coming Resolution of the European Crisis," Policy Briefs PB12-1, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    9. Ruxanda Berlinschi, 2010. "Reputation concerns in aid conditionality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 433-459, December.
    10. Miguel Otero-Iglesias, 2015. "Stateless Euro: The Euro Crisis and the Revenge of the Chartalist Theory of Money," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 349-364, March.
    11. C. Fred Bergsten & Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, 2012. "The Coming Resolution of the European Crisis: An Update," Policy Briefs PB12-18, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Reinsberg, Bernhard & Kern, Andreas & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2021. "The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    2. Gerasimos Tsourapas & Sotirios Zartaloudis, 2022. "Leveraging the European Refugee Crisis: Forced Displacement and Bargaining in Greece's Bailout Negotiations," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 245-263, March.
    3. Pitsoulis, Athanassios & Schwuchow, Soeren, 2018. "Though this be madness: A game-theoretic perspective on the Brexit negotiations," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181635, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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