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Terror and Counterterror Operations: Differential Game with Cyclical Nash Solution

Author

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  • G. Feichtinger

    (Vienna University of Technology)

  • A. J. Novak

    (University of Vienna)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to study efficient measures to combat terror. To choose efficient actions against terror organizations, the response of terrorists has to be taken into consideration. Thus, an appropriate framework to study the intertemporal strategic interactions of Western governments and terror organizations is dynamic game theory. Using the open-loop Nash solution concept, it turns out that the system may exhibit long-run persistent oscillations. However, transitory behavior is nonunique.

Suggested Citation

  • G. Feichtinger & A. J. Novak, 2008. "Terror and Counterterror Operations: Differential Game with Cyclical Nash Solution," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 541-556, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joptap:v:139:y:2008:i:3:d:10.1007_s10957-008-9400-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10957-008-9400-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Keohane, Nathaniel O & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 2003. "The Ecology of Terror Defense," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 26(2-3), pages 201-229, March-May.
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    4. Keohane, Nathaniel & Van Roy, Benjamin & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2007. "Managing the quality of a resource with stock and flow controls," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 541-569, April.
    5. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T. & Cauley, Jon, 1983. "A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 36-54, March.
    6. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329.
    7. Lee, Dwight R, 1988. "Free Riding and Paid Riding in the Fight against Terrorism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 22-26, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Xing Gao & Weijun Zhong & Shue Mei, 2013. "Information Security Investment When Hackers Disseminate Knowledge," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 352-368, December.
    2. A. J. Novak & G. Feichtinger & G. Leitmann, 2010. "A Differential Game Related to Terrorism: Nash and Stackelberg Strategies," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 144(3), pages 533-555, March.
    3. Kjell Hausken & Jun Zhuang, 2011. "Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T -Period Game," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 8(1), pages 46-70, March.
    4. Seidl, Andrea & Kaplan, Edward H. & Caulkins, Jonathan P. & Wrzaczek, Stefan & Feichtinger, Gustav, 2016. "Optimal control of a terror queue," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(1), pages 246-256.
    5. João Ricardo Faria & Emilson C. D. Silva & Daniel G. Arce, 2017. "Intertemporal Versus Spatial Externalities in Counterterror Policy Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 402-421, September.
    6. Kjell Hausken, 2020. "Governmental combat of migration between competing terrorist organisations," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 30(3), pages 21-46.
    7. João Ricardo Faria & Andreas Novak & Aniruddha Bagchi & Timothy Mathews, 2020. "The Refugee Game: The Relationship between Individual Security Expenditures and Collective Security," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-13, June.
    8. Halkos, George & Papageorgiou, George, 2014. "Exploring the optimality of cyclical emission rates," MPRA Paper 54915, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Catherine C. Langlois & Jean-Pierre P. Langlois, 2011. "The Escalation of Terror: Hate and the Demise of Terrorist Organizations," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(5), pages 497-521, November.
    10. Li, Bo & Zhang, Ranran & Jin, Ting & Shu, Yadong, 2021. "Parametric approximate optimal control of uncertain differential game with application to counter terror," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    11. João Ricardo Faria & Daniel Arce, 2021. "The Path of Terror Attacks," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-11, April.
    12. Hausken, Kjell, 2019. "Governmental combat of the dynamics of multiple competing terrorist organizations," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 33-55.
    13. Bakker, Craig & Webster, Jennifer B. & Nowak, Kathleen E. & Chatterjee, Samrat & Perkins, Casey J. & Brigantic, Robert, 2020. "Multi-Game Modeling for Counter-Smuggling," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).

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