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Network formation and anti-coordination games

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Author Info

  • Yann Bramoullé
  • Dunia López-Pintado

    ()

  • Sanjeev Goyal
  • Fernando Vega-Redondo

Abstract

We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior in 2×2 anti-coordination games – games where a player’s best response is to choose an action unlike that of her partner. We characterize the equilibrium networks as well as study the effects of network structure on individual behavior. Our analysis shows that both network architecture and induced behavior crucially depend on the value of the cost of forming links. In general, equilibrium configurations are found to be neither unique nor efficient. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001820400178
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Games Theory.

Volume (Year): 33 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-19

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2004:i:1:p:1-19

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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

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Related research

Keywords: networks; links; anti-coordination games; efficiency;

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References

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  1. Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2001. "A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 485-508, June.
  2. Aderlini, L. & Ianni, A., 1993. "Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbours," Papers 186, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
  3. Stef Tijs & Anne van den Nouweland & Bhaskar Dutta, 1998. "Link formation in cooperative situations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 245-256.
  4. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  5. Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-093/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  6. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 265-291, November.
  7. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
  8. Samuelson Larry, 1994. "Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-65, October.
  9. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Siegfried Berninghaus & Stephan Schosser & Bodo Vogt, 2013. "Equilibrium Selection under Limited Control - An Experimental Study of the Network Hawk-Dove Game," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-048, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  2. Feri, Francesco, 2007. "Stochastic stability in networks with decay," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 442-457, July.
  3. Bramoulle, Yann, 2007. "Anti-coordination and social interactions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 30-49, January.
  4. Filippo Vergara Caffarelli, 2009. "Networks with decreasing returns to linking," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 734, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  5. Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, 2007. "A Bargaining Approach To Coordination In Networks," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-28, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  6. Rong Rong & Daniel Houser, 2012. "Growing Stars: A Laboratory Analysis of Network Formation," Working Papers 1035, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, revised Oct 2012.
  7. Siegfried Berninghaus & Stephan Schosser & Bodo Vogt, 2011. "Complexity of Networking - An Experimental Study of the Network Hawk Dove Game," FEMM Working Papers 110024, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  8. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2012. "Forward-looking behavior in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 35-52.

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